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3 Cities and local growth 
Summary
Since 2010 the Government has devolved powers, funding and responsibility to local 
areas through a variety of means. The last six years have seen the creation of 39 Local 
Enterprise Partnerships and the agreement of 28 City Deals, 39 Growth Deals and ten 
devolution deals. This has resulted in rapid change in the local government landscape 
and the roles and remits of many of the bodies involved. There is wide support for 
the principle of devolving powers from the centre to local areas, which are often best 
placed to identify and respond to the needs of local people. However, we are concerned 
that not all devolution deals are coherent: they lack clear objectives; and are not 
aligned geographically with other policies or local bodies. There has been insufficient 
consideration by central government of local scrutiny arrangements, of accountability 
to the taxpayer and of the capacity and capability needs of local and central government 
as a result of devolution. We are clear that while devolution is driven by political 
decisions, this does not absolve central government departments of exercising sufficient 
and effective oversight of implementation. This is an untested policy and there are 
clear tensions emerging, with evidence of some devolution deals already beginning to 
unravel. As the devolution agenda progresses, in order to maximise the prospects for 
success, we will want to see greater clarity from government about what they are hoping 
to achieve and stronger consideration of the issues we highlight in this report.
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Introduction
The Cities and Local Growth Unit is made up of officials from the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (the Department) and the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. Together with HM Treasury, they jointly oversee and 
co-ordinate government’s devolution agenda, and have recently overseen the negotiation 
and implementation of ten bespoke devolution deals, which devolve powers, funding and 
responsibilities to local areas. The broad objectives for devolution deals have not been 
set out in specific terms; however, they are broadly rooted in localism with the professed 
aims of supporting economic growth, encouraging public service reform and improving 
accountability.
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) are central to government’s plans for devolution. 
Following the abolition of Regional Development Agencies in 2010, 39 LEPs were 
established as strategic partnerships to bring together the public and private sector, and 
identify economic priorities in their local areas. Each LEP is designed to represent a 
functional economic area. In 2014 it was announced that LEPs would be responsible for 
overseeing locally negotiated Growth Deals from 2015–16 to 2020–21, funded from the 
£12 billion Local Growth Fund. LEPs are accountable via a nominated local authority, and 
have signed up to local assurance frameworks that set out the arrangements for ensuring 
transparency, governance and value for money.
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Conclusions and recommendations
1. Government has not made the objectives of devolution sufficiently clear. It is 
therefore not clear how they will judge success and measure progress. The experience 
of devolution in England and elsewhere provides inconclusive evidence for whether 
it results in economic growth and improved outcomes from public services. Given 
that these new policies are untested, it is vital that systems and structures to establish 
whether devolution is producing the desired effects are put in place as soon as 
possible. The Department, together with local areas, is establishing five-year reviews 
to assess some elements of the devolution deals. However, outside of these it is not 
yet clear how quickly central government would be able to identify if and where 
things are going wrong and at what point it would intervene to resolve any issues.
Recommendation: Government should be specific and clear about what it is trying 
to achieve by devolving services to local areas. It should then set out how it will 
monitor progress against these goals. It should also be clear on where it believes 
that outcomes are a matter for local leaders to decide and where centrally imposed 
targets are more appropriate.
2. The experience of local areas in negotiating devolution deals has not been 
consistent with government’s intended ‘bottom up’ approach. The rhetoric 
surrounding devolution is that local areas are the driving force behind the deals. 
However in practice central government is stipulating certain requirements, such 
as around local governance, without making them sufficiently clear up front. For 
example, some local areas have expressed dissatisfaction that they have to adopt 
a mayoral model as a pre-condition of a devolution deal, even in cases where they 
do not think the model appropriate to local needs. The timing of devolution deal 
announcements has been driven by central government milestones such as spending 
reviews and budgets. Central government has not set out clearly what is required 
from local areas in putting forward devolution proposals, and equally what is and 
is not on offer from central government in return. There are unresolved tensions 
between a stated wish to let local areas put together innovative arrangements and a 
central desire to impose particular governance models.
Recommendation: Government needs to be clearer with local areas what is 
and what is not on offer; and what is mandatory as part of devolution deals. 
Government should also listen to local areas about their particular needs to avoid 
a ‘one size fits all’ model being imposed.
3. The full financial implications of devolution deals are not yet clear. The devolution 
deals include new investment funding which will be pooled together with local 
growth fund allocations and consolidated transport funding into ‘single pots’ for 
local areas. Although government announced in the March 2016 Budget that the 
initial single pots for six of the areas with devolution deals would total £2.86 billion 
over five years, we have yet to see an area breakdown other than for the additional 
investment funding element. The additional investment funding, the funding most 
associated with devolution deals, appears to have been more a product of local areas 
seeking to achieve parity with each other than a structured assessment of each area’s 
local needs. There is generally poor transparency of per capita spending by area 
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across government, which means it is difficult to put into context, and therefore 
form any assessment of the appropriateness of, the differing funding amounts 
agreed with local areas in devolution deals and growth deals.
Recommendation: As the full financial implications of devolution deals emerge, 
government should ensure that they are presented transparently in a way that can 
be compared between areas, including on a per capita basis.
4. The scale of devolution deals and the pace of the implementation is extremely 
challenging. Government has set an ambitious timetable for local areas and itself in 
order for secondary legislation to be passed by November 2016, and therefore allow 
sufficient time for setting up the mayoral elections in May 2017. In order to meet 
this timetable, local areas need to publish and consult on their governance plans 
and final geographical composition over the summer. Any delay in this process, 
or in the passage of the required secondary legislation through Parliament, could 
put the proposed May 2017 elections at risk. The speed of the process so far has 
already led to a lack of meaningful consultation with stakeholders, including local 
MPs, councils and voters. Government must be mindful that once the a system is in 
place, unpicking it would be complex and expensive for local areas and confusing 
for citizens.
Recommendation: Government should ensure that the timetable remains feasible 
and that it has clear contingency plans for potential delays in local areas or the 
legislative process.
5. It is not clear that combined authorities, LEPs and local partners have sufficient 
capacity and capability. The pace of the change in the role and remit of both LEPs 
and combined authorities has been rapid. LEPs were established as non-resource 
intensive strategic partnerships, but are now responsible for overseeing delivery 
of the £12 billion Local Growth Fund, representing a significant increase in their 
responsibilities and influence over spending locally. There is varying capacity and 
capability across the LEPs, and a large number of them do not feel that they have 
sufficient resources to meet government’s expectations or governance requirements. 
They are also relying on local authorities for staff and expertise at a time when 
local authorities are themselves trying to cope with severe financial constraints. 
Combined authorities are also now being given additional responsibilities which in 
many cases involves pooling local resource: a significant challenge in areas where 
there is a limited track record of joint working or combined governance.
Recommendation: As part of the negotiation of the next round of devolution deals 
and growth deals, the Department should perform a structured assessment of 
local capacity at LEP and combined authority level.
6. The Government has not thought through the implications of devolution for 
central government departments. The devolution of functions from central to 
local government has potentially significant implications for the required skills and 
numbers of staff in central government, as well as in local areas. However, government 
has not yet taken a civil service-wide view of the possible impact of devolution on 
their workforce needs. There would be an expectation from the taxpayer that in 
transferring funding and responsibilities to the local level, the headcount of central 
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government would consequently fall. The types of skills needed to manage the new 
arrangements are also likely to be different. As each devolution deal is bespoke, 
there are differing functions being transferred to each area and to varying degrees, 
and central government will need to take account of this variety when carrying out 
its workforce planning.
Recommendation: Government should have a clear idea of how devolution will 
impact on departments’ staffing and skills requirements, feeding this into the 
upcoming Civil Service Workforce Strategy.
7. Plans for proper accountability to the taxpayer at a central, local and ultimately 
parliamentary level are not yet in place. While the specific powers devolved or 
delegated to local government will vary across different parts of the country, in all 
cases devolution deals will require effective local accountability arrangements to be 
put in place. Central government will also need to provide assurance to Parliament 
that the responsibilities transferred are being implemented effectively and that the 
taxpayer is getting value for money in return for the monies invested. We heard that 
the Department is developing, in conjunction with local areas, an accountability 
statement for every deal area, so that it is clear who is accountable for what. Powers 
are also being transferred from a range of government departments, and each of 
these departments will need to set out how its own accountability system will be 
affected. Despite these changes meaning that Parliament’s oversight of significant 
elements of public spending may be considerably reduced, there has not been any 
consultation with Parliament to discuss the matter.
Recommendation: Government must clearly set out accountability processes and 
relationships at all levels. It should share draft accountability statements with the 
Committee before they are finalised.
8. We are not confident that existing arrangements for the scrutiny at local level 
of devolved functions are either robust enough or well supported. Robust and 
independent scrutiny of the value for money of devolved activities is essential 
to safeguarding taxpayers’ money, particularly given the abolition of the Audit 
Commission. Local scrutiny committees are an important mechanism; however, 
given resource constraints and the absence of independent support there is a limit 
to what they can realistically oversee. Currently, local auditors focus on individual 
bodies’ financial statements and arrangements for securing value for money, rather 
than assessing value for money itself. It is not yet clear whether there will be any sort 
of independent institutional scrutiny of devolution deals as a whole, or what form 
this might take. As more powers, funding and responsibilities are devolved to the 
local level, we are therefore concerned that a gap in the scrutiny of value for money 
might be appearing.
Recommendation: Government should set out by November 2016 its plans for 
how it will ensure that local scrutiny of devolved functions and funding will be 
both robust and well supported.
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9. It is alarming that LEPs are not meeting basic standards of governance and 
transparency, such as disclosing conflicts of interest to the public. LEPs are led by 
the private sector, and stakeholders have raised concerns that they are dominated 
by vested interests that do not properly represent their business communities. 
There is a disconnect between decisions being made by local business leaders 
and accountability working via local authorities. It is therefore crucial that LEPs 
demonstrate a high standard of governance and transparency over decision making, 
at least equal to the minimum standards set out by government in the assurance 
framework. It is of great concern that many LEPs appear not be meeting these 
minimum standards. The scale of LEP activity and the sums involved necessitate 
that LEPs and central government be pro-active in assuring the public that decisions 
are made with complete probity. The fact that 42% of LEPs do not publish a register 
of interests is clearly a risk to ensuring that decisions are made free from any actual 
or perceived conflicts of interest. The varying presentation and detail of financial 
information across LEPs also makes it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions or 
make comparisons across LEPs on how they spend public money.
Recommendation: The Department should enforce the existing standards of 
transparency, governance and scrutiny before allocating future funding to LEPs. 
LEPs themselves also need to be more transparent to the public by, for example, 
publishing financial information.
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1 Policy coherence
Introduction
1. On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence 
from the Department for Communities and Local Government (the Department) and 
HM Treasury on English devolution deals and Local Enterprise Partnerships.1 We also 
took evidence from Lord Porter, Chair of the Local Government Association, Professor 
Andy Pike of the University of Newcastle and Martin McTague, National Policy Director 
of the Federation of Small Businesses.
2. The Government has recently announced a series of devolution deals between central 
government and local areas in England. To date, ten bespoke devolution deals have been 
agreed. All of these deals transfer powers, funding and accountability for policies and 
functions previously undertaken by central government. The Cities and Local Growth 
Unit (a joint unit of the Department for Communities and Local Government and the 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills) and HM Treasury jointly oversee and 
co-ordinate government’s devolution agenda, and are responsible for coordinating the 
negotiation, agreement and implementation of devolution deals on behalf of central 
government. These deals are the latest in a range of initiatives and programmes designed 
to support localism and decentralisation, which include Local Enterprise Partnerships 
and the Local Growth Fund.2
3. Following the abolition of Regional Development Agencies in 2010, 39 Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) were established as strategic partnerships to bring together the public 
and private sector to identify economic priorities in their local areas. Each LEP is designed 
to represent a functional economic area. In 2014 it was announced that LEPs would be 
responsible for overseeing locally negotiated Growth Deals from 2015–16 to 2020–21, 
funded from the Government’s £12 billion Local Growth Fund. LEPs are accountable to a 
nominated local authority, and have signed up to local assurance frameworks that set out 
arrangements for ensuring transparency, governance and value for money.3
4. Devolution is an evolving policy area and the deals announced so far are still being 
implemented. However, these new arrangements mean significant changes to how public 
services are delivered and to accountability for large amounts of taxpayers’ money. We 
have examined matters at this point so that the government can take account of our 
recommendations at a relatively early stage of implementation.
The objectives of devolution
5. The Department made clear to us that it has been a deliberate policy to not set out 
a clear statement of specific objectives that it is trying to achieve through devolution 
deals, and not to have a national framework for what is on offer to local government.4 
The Department told us that its primary policy intentions with devolution deals are the 
introduction of directly elected mayors to improve local accountability, economic growth, 
1 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, Session 2015–16, HC 948, 20 April 2016 and C&AG’s Report, Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, Session 2015–16, HC 887, 23 March 2016.
2 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, paras 1, 2, 4
3 C&AG’s Report, Local Enterprise Partnerships, paras 2, 3, 20
4 Qq 45, 77
10  Cities and local growth 
and public service reform. However, we also heard from Professor Pike that the evidence 
that other devolution exercises have improved public service outcomes or economic 
growth is “extremely mixed”.5
6. These broad objectives are not specific or time-bound and the Government has not yet 
set out the total spending commitments and changes that will result from the agreement 
of devolution deals. Some of the details of how and when powers will be transferred to 
mayors are also still being worked through.6
7. An independent panel is being jointly commissioned by local area and central 
government to assess the use and impact of the additional funding being provided by 
central government to areas with devolution deals. The Department and HM Treasury 
anticipate that the five year reviews carried out by the panel will be able to measure the 
economic growth resulting from these policies and provide an assessment of their success.7 
However, both departments were unable to provide assurance that central government 
will be able to identify quickly where things are going wrong and take action within these 
five year periods. The Department told us that there will be a reliance on local scrutiny 
functions and individual frameworks being put in place by a number of departments, 
each of which may well be slightly different.8
Bottom up or top down?
8. Although the Department told us that its approach to devolving powers is “bottom 
up,” it is clear that certain aspects of devolution are very much driven from the centre. 
The Department told us that different areas are able to choose the powers or budgets 
that they wish to be devolved, and to move at different speeds towards devolution. For 
the Department, the aim of this approach is to allow for innovation by local areas and to 
allow them to move at their own pace.9 When we challenged the Department on whether 
the process is genuinely ‘bottom up’ and led by local areas, it responded that it is not 
forcing devolution deals on anyone. Despite this, it is clear that some local areas perceive 
the mayoral model to be a pre-condition of devolution deals even in cases where they do 
not feel that this is suited to their local needs.10 This presents a risk that there will be low 
election turnouts and that local mayors will lack legitimacy as a result.11 Moreover, the 
timing of devolution deal announcements is in line with central government milestones, 
such as spending reviews and budgets, which further suggests that these deals are running 
to a centrally, rather than locally, determined framework.12
9. While each devolution deal has bespoke features, there are several areas of 
commonality in the offers made in the ten devolution deals agreed so far. For example, 
all the deals include agreements for devolved responsibilities in areas of local transport, 
business support and further education.13 However, government has not made it clear in 
the first instance what core expectations they have of local areas in their bids and equally 
5 Q 9; Professor Andy Pike, University of Newcastle (LEP0007)
6 Q 94
7 Q 80
8 Qq 86, 123–125
9 Qq 41, 45
10 Qq 58–62
11 Q 26
12 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, para 2.4
13 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, para 8
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what government is able or unable to offer as part of the deal negotiation.14 For example, 
local proposals on school-age education have not been accepted by central government.15 
For future deals it would be helpful to local areas to have this information transparently 
and up front so that they are able to focus their bids more effectively.16
Financial implications
10. As part of all of the devolution deals agreed so far, except that with Cornwall, HM 
Treasury has provided new funding for investment in economic growth. In each case, 
the Treasury has committed to a 30-year funding stream, commonly for £30 million a 
year, which will be subject to an initial assurance framework being put in place by local 
areas and five-yearly assessments to confirm whether the spending has contributed to 
national economic growth. However, the sums agreed within the deals have not been 
based on any robust assessment of each area’s local needs.17 HM Treasury acknowledged 
that many of these totals for additional investment funding were arrived at through local 
areas wanting equivalent funding to those deals previously agreed.18 As a result the per 
capita funding ranges from £11 a year in the Greater Manchester deal to £27 a year in the 
West of England deal.19
11. We were concerned about the general poor transparency across government of per 
capita spending by area. It is a very useful indicator that can be easily understood by both 
members of the public and by Members of Parliament. We asked what data is available 
and the Department accepted that “it is a fair challenge as to whether we might need to 
improve what is available in these sorts of areas”.20
12. In the March 2016 Budget, the Government announced, for the first six mayoral 
devolution deals, the combination of a number of funding streams into ‘single pots’. The 
single pots initially comprise three funding streams: the additional investment funding; 
consolidated transport funding; and Local Growth Fund allocations. The government 
plans to incorporate other funding streams in the future. The six single pots agreed 
so far total £2.86 billion over five years, but an area breakdown, other than for the 
additional investment funding element, has not yet been published.21 The Treasury told 
us that local areas will be asked to develop assurance frameworks to provide assurance to 
central government that the single pot funding is spent properly and provides value for 
money.22 These will be subject to approval by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government before the additional investment funding is disbursed.23
14 Q 46
15 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, para 8
16 Q 46
17 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, paras 1.15, 1.16
18 Q 156
19 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, Figure 6
20 Qq 160, 161
21 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, para 1.14
22 Q 80
23 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, para 1.14
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2 Implementation
The scale and pace of implementation
13. Government’s intention is that the elections for the directly elected mayors agreed 
as part of devolution deals will take place in May 2017. The Department set out the 
“challenging” timetable required to meet this deadline, with local areas needing to 
agree and consult on the governance details of its new arrangements over the summer. 
The governance proposals will include the specific powers that will be devolved to the 
combined authority and the mayor, and how the combined authority will be set up, 
including final geographical compositions and voting arrangements.24 The Department 
told us that to meet the May 2017 deadline these local proposals will have to be decided 
locally in sufficient time for corresponding secondary legislation to be enacted by early 
November 2016.25
14. We put it to the Department that there has, so far, been little meaningful consultation 
by either the Department or local areas with stakeholders, such as local MPs, councillors 
and voters.26 We heard evidence from Professor Pike that the devolution deals have been 
perceived as “relatively closed and a bit opaque”, with wider stakeholders feeling “a little 
bit out in the cold”.27 Devolution deals were typically agreed by government and council 
leaders and senior officials and only after the agreement is announced are the arrangements 
being consulted on locally and ratified by councils.28
Local capacity and capability
15. The Department describes LEPs’ role as ‘strategic’, with a focus on formulating local 
economic plans and engaging the business community. It told us that LEPs are not, for the 
most part, delivery bodies, and that they rely on local partners and on capability in local 
government to oversee the delivery.29 However, in a relatively short period of time LEPs’ 
role, remit and level of financial influence has increased, and in 2014 it was announced 
that LEPs would be responsible for overseeing the £12 billion Local Growth Fund between 
2015–16 and 2020–21. Given that some LEPs were newly created whereas others were 
based on pre-existing structures, each has a varied history of joint-working, political 
engagement and therefore expertise in overseeing growth projects on this scale.30
16. Overseeing billions of pounds of capital projects requires expertise in economics, 
modelling, forecasting, and monitoring and evaluation. It also requires robust governance 
processes, particularly given that LEPs are led by the private sector. However, the NAO’s 
report shows that an alarming number of LEPs themselves do not feel that they have 
adequate staff or skills. Only 5% of LEPs considered themselves to have adequate resources 
to meet the expectations of government, 69% did not think that they had sufficient 
staff, and 28% did not think that they had sufficiently skilled staff. 31 The Department 
24 Q 94
25 Q 95
26 Qq 132, 180
27 Q 26
28 C&AG’s Report, English devolution deals, para 1.10
29 Q 117
30 Q 112
31 C&AG’s Report, Local Enterprise Partnerships, para 2.24 and Figure 13
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acknowledged that many LEPs are heavily reliant on local authorities. Given the severe 
financial constraints facing local government this creates a risk that such support may 
not be sustainable.32 Like LEPs, combined authorities are expected to take on increased 
responsibilities and to pool resources as part of their devolution deals. We heard from 
Lord Porter that certain areas, such as Manchester, have a strong track record of people 
and partnerships working together. In other areas, the capacity to take on additional and 
joint responsibility varies, and can be limited by whether there is a track record of joint 
working.33
Implications for central government departments
17. The devolution of functions from central to local government also has potentially 
significant implications for the required skills and numbers of staff in central government, 
as well as in local areas. We asked whether government has taken a Civil Service-wide 
view of the possible impact of devolution on their workforce needs and the Treasury said 
it had not taken such a “whole system view” from the centre. The Department did accept 
that the types of skills needed to manage the new arrangements are likely to be different, 
with a shift from being “the planner and the designer to being the convenor, the facilitator 
and the system owner”. As each devolution deal is bespoke, there are differing functions 
being transferred to each area and to varying degrees. There will be both a capacity and 
capability requirement to manage the assortment of arrangements.34
18. We felt that there would be an expectation from the taxpayer that in transferring 
funding and responsibilities to the local level, the headcount of central government would 
consequently fall.35 The Department told us that “it is not an explicit expectation that there 
will necessarily be a quantified reduction due to devolution deals”.36 But the Department 
added that “Over the Civil Service as a whole, in this Parliament, there will be further 
headcount cuts…That is part of all our spending review settlement. A number of different 
things contribute to that, and devolution is one of those.”37 The Department told us that 
local areas were telling them that, through pooling their individual council resources 
across the new combined authority areas, they could “resource their combined authority 
and their mayor with the resources they currently have.”38
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3 Accountability, scrutiny and 
governance
Accountability
19. The specific powers devolved as a result of devolution deals will vary across different 
parts of the country, and will require more effective local accountability arrangements to 
be put in place. The Department told us that is developing, in conjunction with local areas, 
a “clear accountability statement for every deal area, so that those of us who are accountable 
know what we are accountable for.”39 The Department stressed the importance of having 
properly working frameworks in order to maintain oversight of the varying arrangements. 
It further told us that it needs “to keep on top of” such frameworks and that it has “had to 
do more to make sure that those assurance frameworks are working properly.”40 The NAO 
reported considerable variation in the quality of LEPs’ assurance frameworks, which were 
not tested by the Department before allocating Growth Deal funding.41
20. Powers are also being transferred from a range of government departments and 
the Treasury told us, echoing what we heard from them in a previous evidence session, 
that each of these departments will need to set out how its own accountability system 
will be affected.42 HM Treasury told us that despite the overarching responsibility for 
the accountability framework for local government lying with the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, accounting officers of many other departments 
“also need to be clear about how they work in relation to an increasingly devolved world.”43
21. With greater devolution of the delivery of public services, the ability of Members of 
Parliament to scrutinise that delivery could be considerably reduced. We were concerned 
that the impact that these changes will have on parliamentary scrutiny, and how financial 
accountability will operate, has not been sufficiently considered or discussed with us or 
elsewhere in Parliament. The Department told us it would consider how best to engage 
Parliament on the new assurance framework being established and the changing scrutiny 
role it will consequently have.44 The Department also committed to engaging with the 
relevant Members of Parliament as implementation plans are being agreed for each deal 
to clarify “what is actually being devolved and what the future arrangements will be”.45
Local scrutiny
22. Where powers, responsibilities and funding are devolved from the centre, it is vital 
that there is adequate local scrutiny of these devolved activities. The Department told 
us that all combined authorities are required to have local scrutiny committees, which 
have an important function; however they do not have independent support and there 
is very little resource in many local authorities to provide independent evaluation and 
39 Qq 41, 76
40 Q 45 
41 C&AG’s report, Local Enterprise Partnerships, para 3.16, 3.17
42 Q 122; Public Accounts Committee, Accountability for taxpayers’ money—oral evidence, HC 732, 1 March 2016.
43 Q 122
44 Qq 131, 181
45 Q 180
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scrutiny.46 While there are arrangements in place for the independent external audit of 
local authorities, currently the role of local auditors is primarily to focus on individual 
bodies’ financial statements. Although local auditors do consider whether there are 
appropriate arrangements for securing value for money, they do not explicitly assess the 
value for money of devolved services.47
23. We heard from Professor Andy Pike that, with the abolition of the Audit Commission, 
there are currently limited institutional arrangements for assessing local value for money.48 
Central government relies on the system of local accountability for assurance over the 
value for money of funding it gives local authorities. The Department’s core principles 
state that local authorities’ prime accountability is to their local electorate, and that local 
councillors are best placed to decide what is value for money locally.49 Given that services 
are being increasingly devolved to local areas, we raised concerns that there may be a 
gap in value for money scrutiny. It is not yet clear whether there will be institutional 
scrutiny of devolution deals at a sub-national level, or what form this might take.50 The 
Department told us that they will be putting forward proposals for local scrutiny, and we 
will be interested to see whether these proposals allay our concerns.51
LEP governance and transparency
24. LEPs are business-led partnerships between the private sector and local authorities, 
and are intended to steer growth locally strategically in local communities. However, the 
Federation of Small Businesses raised concerns with us that LEPs can be dominated by 
vested interests, and that there is insufficient involvement of the small business sector.52
25. As LEPs have the potential to give business leaders significant influence over decisions 
on how public money is used, it is essential that their decision-making is transparent to the 
public and free of perceived or actual conflicts of interest. In December 2014 government 
set out the standards of governance, transparency and decision-making that they expect of 
LEPs. This was an important step in safeguarding taxpayers’ money, particularly in light 
of the sums involved in the recently negotiated Growth Deals and the increase in the scale 
of LEP activity. However, the Department did not test whether LEPs were meeting the 
required standards before the first round of Growth Deals was paid out to them, and the 
NAO’s review showed there are significant gaps in LEPs’ compliance with the standards 
expected.53
26. The NAO’s review shows, for example, that 42% of LEPs do not publish a register of 
interest, and 16% do not even publish a conflict of interest policy. The Department told 
us that many LEPs do have registers of interest but that these may not be published.54 It 
is therefore unclear how the public are supposed to take assurance that LEP decisions are 
being made with probity. Furthermore, the Federation of Small Business told us that there 
46 Qq 87, 88
47 Q 36
48 Q 36
49 C&AG’s Report, Local government funding: Assurance to Parliament, HC 174, 2014–15
50 Qq 33, 34, 36
51 Q 89
52 Q 20
53 C&AG’s Report, Local Enterprise Partnerships, paras 3.14 to 3.17 and Figure 17
54 Q 135; C&AG’s Report, Local Enterprise Partnerships, Figure 17
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is a lack of rigour in the production of annual accounts by LEPs.55 The NAO reported that 
it is not always easy for the public to see where and how LEPs are spending public funds 
given the variation in how LEPs account for and present this expenditure, which also 
makes it difficult to draw comparisons across LEPs nationally.56 The Department told us 
that they have now written out to LEPs in cases where they have not met the necessary 
standards.57 Clearly though, if government is going to set standards for LEPs they should 
ensure that these standards are being met before funding is paid out to them. We will 
expect to see greater oversight by the Department in future.
55 Q 38
56 C&AG’s Report, Local Enterprise Partnerships, Figure 18 and para 3.20
57 Q 133
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Members present: Meg Hillier (Chair), Mr Richard Bacon, Deidre Brock, Caroline Flint, Mr Stewart 
Jackson, Nigel Mills, David Mowat, Stephen Phillips, John Pugh, Karin Smyth, Mrs Anne-Marie 
Trevelyan
Sir Amyas Morse, Comptroller & Auditor General, Aileen Murphie, Director, National Audit Office, 
Keith Davis, Director, National Audit Office, Adrian Jenner, Director of Parliamentary Relations, 
National Audit Office, and Richard Brown, Treasury Officer of Accounts, were in attendance.
Witnesses: Lord Porter of Spalding, CBE, Chair, Local Government Association, Professor Andy Pike, 
Centre for Urban and Regional Development, University of Newcastle, and Martin McTague, 
National Policy Director, Federation of Small Businesses, gave evidence.
Chair: I will make introductions as people are coming in, because I am aware that one of our 
witnesses has important business in the other place. 
May I first welcome and thank Lord Porter of Spalding, also known as Councillor Gary Porter 
to many of us, for coming at short notice because of a mix-up with witnesses? We appreciate your 
time, and we know that you have to rush off. If you can, please tell me when you might need to 
leave if that is before we finish. I am afraid we ran a bit late; we had lots to discuss today. You know 
where the door is and we will understand—we won’t take it personally, Lord Porter. So I welcome 
Lord Porter of Spalding, who is chair of the Local Government Association and is here in that 
capacity. 
I also welcome Professor Andy Pike from the Centre for Urban and Regional Development 
Studies at Newcastle University, and Martin McTague, the National Policy Director for the 
Federation of Small Businesses. We are here to take evidence on the National Audit Office Reports 
looking at the Government’s devolution agenda. Although we are looking at one agenda, there are 
two reports in front of us today: one on English devolution deals—those in progress so far—and the 
other on local enterprise partnerships, an initiative that has been going a bit longer, which means 
that the NAO has got a bit more to get its teeth into.
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The Committee is very clear that when money is passed down to local areas, whether it be 
local enterprise partnerships or through devolution deals to city regions, that does not absolve the 
Government of accountability for that money. Nevertheless, there can be a tension between local 
power and influence and what Government should do, and how we get that right is a big part of the 
debate. We are also keen to examine what capacity there is in local areas to ensure that the work 
being passed down to them is delivered, and how taxpayers can hold those local leaderships to 
account for the spending of that money and make sure that things are delivered. 
One of the bigger questions that a lot of colleagues around the House have raised with us is 
how we will ever be sure that enough money—or not too much—has gone down locally. The 
Treasury may want to know that not too much is going down to a local level; it is about getting that 
balance. If it is not working locally, how does a local area go back and ask for more without the 
Treasury saying, “You’ve had your lot”? We have to get that tension out.
First, Stewart Jackson has a declaration of interest and then I am going to ask him to kick off 
the questioning.
Mr Jackson: Chair, I just want to declare that I am a vice-president of the Local Government 
Association.
John Pugh: I am also a vice-president.
Q1 Chair: We are rich with vice-presidents of the Local Government Association—so you are 
being watched, Lord Porter. 
I go back to the point I just raised. I shall ask Lord Porter to start. How can you be sure, when 
you are negotiating these deals, that the right amount of money is being negotiated? Clever people 
in the Treasury and the DCLG are watching how this money is going down, there is a ministerial 
objective to get it down the line and you have to negotiate. Have you got the capacity at local level? 
You are from Lincolnshire; is the capacity there to ensure that you are going to get a good deal out 
of Government to deliver the agenda?
Lord Porter: I think we need to broaden the debate away from just the financial sense of 
whether this is a good deal; it is more than just the money. Some would argue that devolution is 
worth doing in its own right, without the additional funding that it might bring, just to be able to get 
greater local control over services. 
Certainly, the Lincolnshire one has received less money than some of the first metropolitan 
deals that were going forward, but I do not see that as a barrier. Local government never has 
sufficient capacity to be able to do detailed bids. That is why the Government need to make sure it is 
as simple as possible for us so that we do not have further incidents like we have had this week in 
the Lincolnshire context, where all our legal officers were working over the weekend to make sure 
that the governance report is ready. 
More lead-in time for some parts of the work might be useful, but if it is important to local 
councils to do the stuff, we will make the resources available; something else will be done slower 
than it would have been done otherwise. If the Government ever get back to the stage where they 
have plenty of money washing around, we will obviously make a good case for why we are the best 
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place to land it. But the prize, certainly from a local government perspective, is greater than the 
resource that we are putting in, and we will make it work—we will make the resource work.
Q2 Chair: Correct me if I am wrong—before I go on to the other witnesses—but my 
perception is that compared with Greater Manchester, Greater Lincolnshire was not quite such an 
entity in its own right. I will declare an interest: I have a lot of family in Lincolnshire, so I hope I am 
saying the right thing on their accounts. [Interruption.] I wouldn’t want to intrude on private grief. 
Seriously, Lord Porter, Manchester was well-established as a combined authority with a 
strong regional leadership anyway; perhaps not quite the same can be said in Lincolnshire. Do you 
think that put you at a disadvantage or at an advantage?
Lord Porter: Not a disadvantage, but we had to achieve things like trust in partners at a 
faster rate than would have been ideal. Ideally, we would all have been working together a lot 
longer. The seven districts in the county council have that arrangement, and we have been working 
well together, but with the two unitaries that have joined, there is the old geographical Lincolnshire 
thing that binds everybody together—although you will have guessed from my accent that I am not 
from there. They are a welcoming community anyway. 
Manchester has a strong track record of people and partnerships working together and of 
leaders changing and partnerships still staying together, so that group of people is long tried and 
trusted. Lincolnshire met its first challenge two weeks ago, when we talked about some resource 
and how it would be deployed. I think they met their first challenge well—better than I would have 
anticipated, in fact—and agreed to do something for the benefit of the partnership that would not 
necessarily have benefited most members of the partnership, but it was necessary to make the 
partnership work. The longer you are working together, the easier it is to trust each other, because 
you would have built that up. 
Q3 Chair: You are obviously speaking for the Local Government Association as well. There is 
that range—I chose those two as examples, but we are already seeing some deals that are 
supposedly done that are looking as though they might be unravelling a bit. There are letters to 
newspapers, people objecting and serious debates going on. Do you think that those authority areas 
are really wedded to it still or is a problem emerging already? 
Lord Porter: If you ask anybody in local government whether they like the idea of 
devolution, they will all say yes. Some form of devolved governance has to be better for an area 
because you are bringing the responsibility closer to people. 
In your opening remarks, you said that there is still a need for ministerial oversight and 
responsibility, but if devolution works properly that can’t be the case, because if it is a devolved 
service, there is no way that a Minister or Secretary of State can, or should, be held to account for 
something if it fails. The blame should rest at a local level if the service has been devolved. As local 
government, we can’t have it both ways: we can’t say, “Can you give us the power to do this stuff 
and the resources to do it? And by the way, if we don’t manage it properly, that’s your fault back in 
London.” 
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Chair: We will probably come back to the issue of provider of last resort. I will bring in 
Stewart Jackson, then Nigel Mills—I am just aware that Lord Porter has to head off, so we will focus 
on him.
 Q4 Mr Jackson: The devolution deals are predicated on effectively no powers being taken 
from local authorities—principal authorities—such as county councils and district councils; there is 
some opaque issue about local enterprise partnerships, which has to be sorted out. 
But just to play devil’s advocate, could you not make a case for saying in East Anglia, for 
instance, “We have already witnessed the upgrade of the A11, plans to upgrade the A47 and the A1, 
the “Norwich in 90” campaign and the bridge at Lowestoft”? In other words, these things have 
happened organically because of the vision and leadership of either the LEPs or the principal 
authorities and district councils. My question is: why do we need to move forward with devolution 
and transfer those ministerial powers, when the things that we want—effectively, infrastructure 
planning and business support—are happening anyway?
Lord Porter: That is the start, not the end of the journey. If all we ever get to is arguing 
about whether we build this road or that bridge, we will all have lost an opportunity. This should be 
about full public sector reform. 
5 Mr Jackson: What does that look like then, Gary?
Lord Porter: Well, in Lincolnshire, we have got the health team now looking at designing 
more CCGs or all that STP, or whatever that health stuff is, outside our area. If we have a population 
of 1,060,000 or whatever, surely the health service should be designed inside the area. 
If we have not got enough money as a country—everybody seems to have accepted that 
money has gone out of fashion and we don’t have enough to deliver all the services that people have 
come to want and expect—then we have to do something differently. You either have to push more 
down to local control, so that you can get the benefit of local experience working out how to do it, 
or go to a Russian system and centralise it all. But the hybrid model that we have clearly cannot do 
it. We have not got enough money in the system to carry on. My money is on pushing it local—and 
not just to local councils, but beyond local councils.
Q6 Mr Jackson: How are you going to manage the tension that has inevitably happened in 
previous reorganisations—that messy fractiousness? Certainly in the east, most people seem to be 
saying that the top tier will shrivel and disappear, so you will then have the strategic level and the 
districts. How will you manage that? It is going to be a difficult process, isn’t it?
Lord Porter: But nobody has said that that’s the model. People on one side of the argument 
are using that—particularly in the Anglia one, where people are saying, “Oh, well, you only want to 
do that because you want to get rid of the counties or the districts.” Well, reorganisation does not 
get rid of counties or districts; it gets rid of counties and districts. They would all disappear if we 
went down the reorganisation route, but devolution is not predicated on that.
I go back to the example of Lincolnshire because I live there. In Lincolnshire, there are 10 
authorities sitting around the table plus the chairman of the LEP. In Manchester, there are 10 
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leaders of authorities sitting around the table plus the chairman of the LEP. It does not matter. The 
number is the number. If there is a criticism of the Anglia one, it is that there are too many people. It 
is like doing an accumulator bet: the more people you try to arrange a partnership with, the more 
the chances are that that partnership will not work. I would start off small and expand from that.
Q7 Nigel Mills: You made a bold statement that devolution would achieve better results 
than the current position. What is the evidence base for that statement?
Lord Porter: Because we have singularly failed now. Stewart has just spoken about a load of 
infrastructure projects that have been aspired to, but have singularly failed to be delivered. The A47 
is still a death trap; you can’t get anywhere. The bridge at Lowestoft is still a bridge. The bridge at 
Great Yarmouth is still—
Q8 Nigel Mills: With respect, Lord Porter, we are being a bit parochial here. What evidence 
does the LGA have for saying that devolution will produce better results?
Lord Porter: My staff will give you the full paperwork about analysing the cost of each type 
of service and how it will be broken down. Rather than me trying to have all the numbers in my head 
and giving you the wrong ones, I will make sure that my staff give you written answers. 
Q9 Chair: We have a really good submission from the LGA on the issue. I am aware that we 
have other witnesses to bring in. Perhaps, Professor, you would like to comment on the wider point? 
Could you wrap into your answer the issue of how local representatives hold the new structures—
the new mayor or combined authority—to account?
Professor Pike: On your point about the evidence base, we did a study in 2011 funded by 
DCLG. The international evidence for decentralisation and public service outcomes is extremely 
mixed. You can find arguments and evidence to support strong and weak decentralisation, with 
corresponding links to public service outcomes. From reviewing that international evidence, we 
concluded that the nature and substance of that decentralisation is most important in terms of what 
most influences the public service outcomes. It is how the decentralisation is designed, what 
objectives it has, and how it is involved in the local authority structures in a country. It is the size, 
shape and form of decentralisation that is important.
Q10 Nigel Mills: On size, does the evidence suggest that you need to have a certain level of 
population or something—a critical mass—for it to work?
Professor Pike: Yes, there is a certain scale in some of the international literature that 
suggests that it is sometimes cities and their regional hinterlands—the city regional model—that 
work best.
Q11 Nigel Mills: Are we talking about several million people, fewer than a million or 1 
million?
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Professor Pike: Yes, it varies greatly, as you would imagine, across an international context.
Q12 Chair: What is the range?
Professor Pike: The range would be, for example, from some of the prosperous parts of 
southern Germany, where there is not really an urban centre bigger than about 1.5 million people. It 
works quite well there with a federal-structured, two-tiered, decentralised system. You can scale 
that up to some American metro regions such as Chicago where there is a strongly federal, 
decentralised system and 15 million or 16 million people. It varies too much to draw any—
Q13 Mr Bacon: Can we use the southern Germany example for a second?
Professor Pike: Yes.
Q14 Mr Bacon: You say it works there with a decentralised, two-tier structure. Which two 
tiers in southern Germany are you referring to?
Professor Pike: We are talking about a federal structure in Germany—between a national 
level and a state level, effectively. Then you have local government beneath that.
Q15 Mr Bacon: So you are talking about the Länder and something below that as well. It is 
not actually a two-tier structure. Locally, it is a—
Professor Pike: It all goes to three tiers when you have city authorities beneath the level of 
the Länder.
Q16 Mr Bacon: When you said that there is not a metropolitan area larger than 1.5 million 
people, you mean a city of 1.5 million people with an area on top of it.
Professor Pike: City regions of 1.5 million.
Q17 Stephen Phillips: Our original bid in Lincolnshire was actually for the county of 
Lincolnshire, as Lord Porter will know, which was below 1 million. We had to bring in the unitary 
authorities from the north to push it over 1 million. Were the Treasury and DCLG right that fewer 
than 1 million was too small?
Professor Pike: You will have to ask them. I think the key thing, certainly in the way the 
process of decentralisation has unfolded in England in particular since 2010, has been a strong 
emphasis on big urban centres to try to address the local growth principle and rationale for 
decentralisation. As they have moved beyond the major urban centres for the City deals, Growth 
Deals and devolution deals, there has been a sense of trying to understand what makes an 
appropriate scale outside cities, hence the focus on these community-style deals.
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Stephen Phillips: Thank you very much. I apologise that I have a delegated legislation 
Committee, but I shall come back. 
Chair: You are busy with other legislation to deal with.
Martin McTague: There is a lot of good will in the small business community for this 
devolution process. We have surveyed quite a few of our members and got a generally positive 
response to it. I think the Government have got support in following this process, but at the 
moment, what we are seeing is really a private conversation between central Government and local 
government. There is some gesture towards involving business, but certainly very little in the way of 
involvement for small business. It seems to be—
Q18 Chair: What do your members think they’re going to get out of it? What is the win for 
small business? 
Martin McTague: They believe they will get closer to decision makers, which they believe 
will get better decisions. That is generally the view that most people are taking. 
Q19 Chair: On things like infrastructure? 
Martin McTague: Yes. They believe that some of their priorities will be responded to more 
effectively by local government than by central Government. But generally, I think the view is, “We’ll 
wait. When the deals are negotiated at the central and local government level, that’s when we’ll get 
involved. It is at that detailed level that we think we need to be involved.”
Lord Porter: Just to come back on that, in the one in Lincolnshire, that is not the case. The 
chairman of the local enterprise partnership led quite strongly with that. The Federation of Small 
Businesses is on the LEP, so I am assuming that the conversations I was having with my members, 
the chairman of the LEP was also having with her members, so a lot of that was driven—
Professor Pike: That is an exception, though. 
Q20 David Mowat: I will ask the same question, actually, because the answer implies that 
your members are not engaged in the LEP, or that somehow the LEP does not adequately represent 
them in the geography that you come from. 
Martin McTague: There is a very strong feeling among our members—we have given 
evidence to other bodies about this—that, at the moment, LEPs tend to be dominated by two vested 
interests: single businesses with a specific reason to be involved with the LEP, and the public sector 
through local government. There is very little, if any, involvement with small businesses across the 
country. If there is a small business involved, it tends not to have a constituency that it can refer 
back to.
Q21 David Mowat: Your point there is a different point, in a sense. Your point is that you 
think LEPs should have a bigger constituent in the small business community. 
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Martin McTague: They should, yes.
Q22 David Mowat: That may or may not be right, but in terms of the whole devolution 
agenda, I would be very surprised if in most places the LEPs are not a big part of it, and the LEPs are 
in many cases business-led. Perhaps the issue with small businesses is the fact that in lots of places, 
the chambers of commerce are strong and may have a voice, but in many other places, they can be 
quite weak. It is very patchy.
Martin McTague: It is very patchy across the country, but it is not even a matter of 
individual business organisations and whether they have representation. At the moment, the model 
is that individual businesses are meant to speak on behalf of all businesses. If 99% of all businesses 
have fewer than 250 employees, it is quite hard to represent that constituency. You  might have a 
guy who has run a chip shop, but does that mean he can speak on behalf of every small business in 
his community? 
Q23 David Mowat: Well, quite, but I am not sure what you are suggesting. It is almost an 
impossible task to have a—
Martin McTague: No, it is not an impossible task, because we made the point clearly to the 
Chancellor, and he backed it in the Budget recently. We feel that there should be a nominated 
person on the board of the LEP who has responsibility for that community. The process of reaching 
that—
Q24 David Mowat: For the community, or for the small business community? 
Martin McTague: For the small business community. So, in other words, we recognise that it 
is harder to get to small businesses and have them adequately represented, but if nobody is 
accountable for that relationship, then nothing happens. 
Q25 David Mowat: In fact, your evidence to us is that you think the LEP—I think this is a 
good idea—should have somebody on it who is responsible for medium-sized and small businesses. 
That is what you are saying, and it feeds into the process.
Martin McTague: Absolutely. And it is a two-way process. The LEP would be able to 
communicate with that community as well, and the other way around.
Q26 Mr Jackson: Professor Pike, is the problem of accountability and authority a cultural 
issue? If we look at police and crime commissioners, for instance, we have never had a culture of 
electing a police commissioner, so we have very low turnout and low interest in the elections, even 
this time. Given that the vast bulk of towns and cities that held ballots on a mayor said that they did 
not want one, with the exception of Bristol, I wonder if there is a danger, if a mayoral culture is 
effectively forced a on these massive sub-regional entities, that it will lack authority as a result?
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Professor Pike: Going back to the way that the process of decentralisation has unfolded, it 
has been quite ad hoc, a bit piecemeal and quite episodic; it has gone fast and then slow. It has had 
a lot of conditions put on it, and it has been slightly centrally-orchestrated. For all the talk of localism 
and decentralisation, the centre has really set the rules of the game with the timing of the 
framework, such as it is.
Mr Jackson: Perish the thought. 
Chair: You’ve got to start somewhere. There is a bit of a trick in the name isn’t there, to be 
fair?
Professor Pike: Indeed. The deals have been interesting in bringing quite a narrow cadre of 
actors together—elected politicians, appointed officials, external advisors—working in private. The 
decision-making, if you like, on long-term, large-scale decisions has been relatively closed and a bit 
opaque. That is where these questions about accountability and transparency really come to the 
fore. What you have then are wider sets of public actors—small business, trade unions, the civic 
sector, the further and higher education sectors, the environment sector—who feel a little bit out in 
the cold, certainly relative to where they were under the regional structures. The broader public 
engagement questions then become problematic, too. 
It is as if we haven’t really learnt the lessons from back in 2004 with elected regional 
assemblies, when there was not a great deal on offer, the public weren’t engaged and it kind of fell 
into the sand. How can we do decentralisation differently to make it more of an open, inclusive 
process, so that it is not just an end in itself, but a means to better public service outcomes to make 
people’s health and wellbeing and prosperity better, rather than a change in the structures for 
change’s sake? 
Q27 Nigel Mills: Professor Pike, perhaps going back to the lessons from the international 
evidence, what we will end up with here is a slightly patchy devolution, where some areas have it 
and some areas may not, and some areas will get everything and some will not get bits of it. Is that a 
recipe for success, or does that give you some concern that none of us will have any idea of who is 
doing what, where and when?
Professor Pike: The NAO’s Report on devolution deals is very telling. The table that actually 
shows the different responsibilities that are now spread across the deals—
Chair: Can we just make sure we are referring to the right document? That is appendix 3 on 
page 43. 
Professor Pike: Basically, through the approach the Government have taken, which has been 
a willingness to have a very localised, decentralised approach—albeit centrally-orchestrated—where 
you have these bespoke and tailored deals that are matched to local ambition and strategic 
planning, you are inevitably going to have this unevenness. Our work for the iBUILD research centre 
has basically revealed that the local areas like that, because they get a conduit straight to central 
Government to put their claims forward and develop their strategies and so forth. 
There are also issues with it, too, in the sense that there is a lack of accountability, it is a very 
centrally-orchestrated process, and they didn’t really know the rules of the game—what is on and 
off the table for these deals—at the start of the process. The criteria for what is or is not included 
Oral evidence: Cities and Local Growth, HC 913 10
are not always clear. It is a novel, informal way of public policy making, which is quite new in the UK 
context. That produces these asymmetrical results. The proof of the pudding will be, with 
strengthened monitoring, assessment and evaluation criteria, whether those bespoke and tailored 
arrangements do the kinds of things that those areas want. That will be the true test of whether this 
system actually works.
Q28 Nigel Mills: There are two further questions that come there. You talked about whether 
we have bespoke monitoring and assessment regimes. I am not sure whether we are very clear on 
what those regimes are at all.
Professor Pike: Not too bespoke, because then it is all different everywhere all of the time; 
there are no common standards against which to measure things like value for money and so forth.
Q29 Nigel Mills: But do you think that, for this to be successful, we need common standards 
that could be used to assess how some of these important functions are working?
Professor Pike: Yes. I think it is a mix of both. To be fair to the Cities and Local Growth unit, it 
is trying to work towards that, in terms of trying to get frameworks in place to understand how to 
make sense of that, looking England-wide, to get these common standards. Clearly, there are 
bespoke and tailored things that each of the deals have been looking to do in their own particular 
areas, to address this infrastructure problem, that skills issue and so forth. 
Q30 Nigel Mills: It strikes me that a lot of these deals are really quite similar. Everyone gets 
bus franchising and smart tickets. Nearly everyone gets rail and roads. Everyone gets land disposal 
and a mayor and social planning, and everyone gets the redesign of 16-plus education. In actual fact, 
there are little ticks that are not there for some, probably for some quite good local reasons. Do you 
not think that we started out with what we thought was a locally-negotiated thing, based on what 
we thought our priorities were, and what we have got is, “Well, you can have this”, “OK, well we will 
take it all”? There are a couple of special deals in Manchester.
Professor Pike: Part of it is the process of deal-making, which both and local government 
and central Government have gone through. It is the idea of using the deals to promote governance 
reform, strategy-making and policy prioritisation in particular areas. There has certainly been 
learning by precedent, so “What did they get in their deal? Could we try to ask for that in our deal?” 
because there is no rulebook. There is no guidebook about what is on or off the table as part of this 
process. Places have inevitably looked at the deal that was last made and thought, “Yes, that would 
be something that we would like.”
Q31 David Mowat: What I’m trying to get you to answer is this: are we going to end up with 
an effective system if manufacturing advice in Manchester is done by the Mayor of Greater 
Manchester, but next door in Liverpool it is done by central Government? That seems slightly 
bizarre, doesn’t it?
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Professor Pike: Does it provide a public service outcome for the public money that is spent, 
which has been appropriated for that area? That will be the guide. That will be the yardstick against 
which it will be judged. 
Q32 David Mowat: But aren’t you worried that central Government will lose the capability 
to pick manufacturing advice, and to do that effectively? It is now doing that in a third of the country 
rather than the whole thing. Would it not have been better to have that advice given locally 
everywhere, or nationally everywhere, rather than two thirds and one third?
Professor Pike: The gist of the idea is that you can have a much more pluralist approach, so 
different approaches can then be applied and followed in each area, appropriate to local partners. 
The economic base and structure in different city regions and regional economies are going to be 
different, so you are going to need different kinds of advice. It is hard to say you have a one-size-fits-
all, top-down Whitehall blueprint that is characteristic of our very centralised system in the UK, and 
in England in particular, versus a system now where we tried to move, from 2010, towards a more 
decentralised, more bespoke, more tailored kind of system for delivering public policy. It goes back 
to the point that it is about the outcomes; a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.
Q33 Caroline Flint: Who do you think should be auditing the role of these new devolutionary 
arrangements?
Professor Pike: Obviously the role of the NAO is very important, in terms of following 
through on the public finance side of it. In some work we have been doing for the ESRC—the 
Economic and Social Research Council—looking across the issues and some of the responses to this, 
there is a sense that there is a bit of a gap, institutionally, in terms of maybe needing some kind of 
decentralisation commission that would look across the piece to try to solve some of these knotty 
issues about decentralisation geographies and the balance of funding. I am not sure quite where it 
would sit institutionally, but there is a bit of a gap between the centre and local levels. Historically in 
the UK we have had this oscillating pendulum in the post-war period between regional organisation, 
local, back to regional and back to local. We are maybe now drifting more towards a sub-regional set 
of institutional arrangements. 
Q34 Caroline Flint: So there is a need for something to audit what’s going on that is not 
there at the moment?
Professor Pike: Yes, it is a bit of a vacuum. If you look internationally, it is very unusual for a 
country the size of the UK to have no intermediate tier that deals with these issues that are bigger 
than city regions and local authorities. It is often some kind of, if only strategic, advisory and 
steering-type institutions that sit in that space, because it is quite a big space between the centre 
and the local in the UK.
Q35 Caroline Flint: You would agree that there has to be something of rigour within this that 
can do the number-crunching to see whether we are getting good value for money with taxpayers’ 
money? Whether that is empowered locally or regionally or—
Oral evidence: Cities and Local Growth, HC 913 12
Professor Pike: Yes, for sure. The NAO sets the lead in terms of the rigour and the quality of 
its scrutiny of these things. You talked about opacity earlier, Chair. One of the interesting things is to 
look at the underlying economic analyses and evidence bases of all of the strategic economic plans 
that the LEPs produced, because there is quite a degree of unevenness across the picture relating to 
local circumstances and resources committed to these questions. The idea of having a more 
evidence-based, objective, stronger rationale behind the priorities that are being articulated locally 
would be helpful.
Q36 Chair: Can I just pick up on the local government audit, which is different to the role 
that the NAO plays nationally. Some of us remember the Bill going through that took out the Audit 
Commission, so there is no-one really to do the value for money studies in that gap. What would you 
see as the ideal set-up?
What would you see as the ideal set up? You said to Caroline Flint that there are different models; is 
there a good model anywhere else in the world, and is it costly? Presumably, it will have to be paid 
for by some part of the system. Where do you think that would best sit?
Professor Pike: That’s institutionally, of course, the idea of having something in that space to 
follow through in the way the Audit Commission used to. We used to have the Improvement and 
Development Agency, too, which was important for the development, learning and knowledge 
sharing—that kind of stuff that was important, too. All that has been stripped out, and are we now 
realising that perhaps we shouldn’t have stripped it out? We still need some of these checks and 
balances to keep an eye on what is done at sub-national sphere.
Q37 Chair: What’s a good international example of what works?
Professor Pike: I’d have to have a look and refer back on that. I can send something 
through—
Chair: If you have any thoughts, please do write to us.
Q38 Mr Bacon: Doesn’t the LGA do some of those functions that you were just talking 
about, in terms of sharing learning?
Professor Pike: They do indeed, yes. There is some very innovative partnership work 
between the LGA and Treasury, for example, in local partnerships on the infrastructure funding stuff, 
so maybe that is a mechanism through which these things can be done. But, the suggestion was that 
it is about rigour, teeth, a systematic, strong—
Caroline Flint: Independence.
Professor Pike: —independent appraisal of these issues at that level.
Martin McTague: The only point I was going to make is that LEPs have been around longer 
than these emerging combined authorities. In the evidence that we have gathered, we see a lack of 
rigour when it comes to analysis of their accounts. We couldn’t find—I think it was less than 50% of 
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them actually produced auditable accounts that we could look at and see where they were spending 
the money. If that is the basis on which we have started, it is not good. 
Q39 Chair: Just to refer colleagues, paragraph 3.19 in the Local Enterprise Partnerships 
Report shows that it is not even possible to know how much many of them pay their senior staff. 
Given that you are in business, and we know from the Committee’s experience that businesses do 
not always want to tell us everything and do not have to because they are not public bodies, what 
would you recommend should be put in place to make sure that that happens? Would you see a kick 
back from businesses getting on board organisations if they have to be that much more transparent?
Martin McTague: I do. The two clear things, it seems to me, that there should be are, at 
least, a register of members’ interests, which is lacking in a lot of the LEPs, so we can’t discern 
whether there is some sort of vested interest involved in decisions that are being made, and some 
idea of value for money—we cannot even assess that. When it was on a fairly small scale, I think 
there was a bit of tolerance within the business community—we’re not dealing with large sums of 
money here—but now we are talking about the local growth fund being quite significant sums of 
money, the tolerance for that kind of looseness is starting to disappear.
Q40 Chair: Thank you very much indeed. We look forward to receiving the written evidence 
from the LGA—I think there are LGA representatives in the room—on the wider issues; I know that 
the LGA has sent a letter on the LEPs Report, but perhaps more widely than that. 
There is one other question that I forgot to ask—sorry, Professor. I think Lord Porter talked 
earlier about the boundaries. The geography is quite different for some of the different devolved 
responsibilities. The health boundaries do not seem to match up with the local authority boundaries. 
Have you looked at that issue and have you got any international examples of where that has 
worked well, or are they all coterminous?
Professor Pike: Yes, perhaps not peculiarly in the English context; we have not done our 
geographies well in terms of the political and administrative structures. The way in which 
decentralisation has unfolded since 2010 has magnified the difficulties. It is unusual in the English 
context to have—what we would say in the jargon—a coterminous set of boundaries. It works well 
in London and it works well in Greater Manchester, but outside those two, you start to struggle to 
find areas where the health area and the functional economic area, which the LEPs are meant to 
work to, and the combined authorities and so forth match up very well. We have quite messy, 
potentially dysfunctional, geographies. 
Elsewhere, in other countries with federal systems, you have got this kind of two-tier 
structure between the national and the sub-national. Then the local government fits in within that—
it is all nicely aligned and integrated—and maybe there is the potential to do things better: public 
policy outcomes might be better and better planned. Alternatively, if we are going to do things in a 
more asymmetrical way, we need to think about how we work with those rather messy geographies.
Chair: Maps—lines on maps—and politicians can cause a lot of argument. We are about to 
have the Permanent Secretary on to explain how she is going to deal with that, among other things. I 
thank you both, and Lord Porter, for coming and giving evidence. Do feel free to write to us. The 
transcript of this hearing will be out in the next couple of days. Our Report on this may be out 
towards the end of May, but we have a number of recesses. We will obviously send you a copy of 
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that. Thank you very much indeed, and do keep watching what we are doing, because this is a very 
big area of work for the Committee over the next four years.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Melanie Dawes, Permanent Secretary, Department for Communities and Local 
Government, Simon Ridley, Director General, Decentralisation and Growth, DCLG, and Catherine 
Frances, Director, Public Services, Her Majesty’s Treasury, gave evidence.
Chair: For anyone who is interested, our hashtag for today’s session is “localgrowth”. Our 
second panel, the people actually accountable for delivering this policy and watching the money, 
are, from left to right, Catherine Frances, the Director of Public Services at the Treasury—welcome; I 
think this is the first time we have seen you at the Committee—Melanie Dawes, one of our frequent 
fliers, the Permanent Secretary at the Department for Communities and Local Government; and 
Simon Ridley, the Director General for Decentralisation and Growth at Communities and Local 
Government—sorry, HM Treasury. 
Simon Ridley: You were right first time, Chair, actually: Department for Communities and 
Local Government. Don’t be confused by the name badge.
Chair: Forgive me. Have you been in front of us before? I think you have.
Simon Ridley: I have, yes.
Q41 Chair: Yes, I thought so. Can I welcome you? You heard the whole discussion earlier. 
Melanie Dawes, I wanted to start with you, just to try to set the context. As I say, it is a very 
important issue for us and a lot of colleagues have raised issues with us over this—and it is quite 
challenging—about how you devolve and let go but also try to hold an accountability line. We talked 
with other people about accountability in Departments, and the Treasury—I think we’ll come back to 
this—were quite complimentary about what you are trying to do on this, but we recognise it is a 
challenging area. 
If you go to page 13, paragraph 21 in the summary of the Report, that first bullet point 
summarises what the NAO thinks, but we recognise that Ministers are entitled to make policy to let 
go and not necessarily set core purposes. I don’t think we necessarily have a contradiction here, but I 
wonder if you could clarify where your thinking is on this so that we can frame the context of our 
discussion today, because we are hoping to have a really meaningful discussion about where this 
emerging policy is going.
Melanie Dawes: Thank you. I very much look forward to the discussion—thank you for 
inviting us again—on this topic. In the end, we are trying to reverse decades of centralisation, and 
the Government’s approach is bottom-up—it is bespoke—and that means that we will get different 
areas choosing different selections of powers or budgets that they wish to be devolved and moving 
at different paces. What we are trying to do in the Department and what I take very seriously in my 
role as the accounting officer, is make sure that there is a framework in place so that we can trace 
those changes, so that we can be clear who is accountable and so that we have monitoring and 
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evaluation and assurance frameworks in place. It is an evolving landscape. We are very grateful for 
the NAO Report, because it is always helpful to have that advice—that independent scrutiny—in this 
area, because it is moving, and we take seriously your recommendations and look forward to what 
the Committee might say in this area, particularly in the area of scrutiny.
Q42 Chair: We appreciate it is difficult to set core purposes in one way, but it depends how 
you define it, because if you look at appendix 3 on page 43, which we referred to earlier, there is a 
lot of commonality across the different bits. You would have thought they might have all talked to 
each other before they put in. Clearly, some areas have certain differences, but there are a lot of 
common things there. Given that and that you are following the money down the line, when do you 
just say, “That’s it; we’ve let go,” and when do you say to an area, “Well, you’re trying to do what 
another area’s doing. Maybe you could learn from them and maybe we could follow and hold you to 
account better”? How do you set that framework from the centre and when do you let go?
Melanie Dawes: Often in DCLG and also in the Treasury, we’re trying to encourage 
Departments to let go. Old habits die hard: quite a lot of what we’re doing is pushing people to be 
more ambitious to take a different approach and to recognise the capability in local government to 
integrate services in a more effective way around the citizen and to know better what their local 
areas need by way of growth. We are often in the pushing seat, if you like, to try to achieve more 
change. Sometimes, where there is a very clear national policy—schools and academies are one 
example—the Government are very clear that they have a particular approach and that those 
powers are not available to be devolved. Sometimes that is the case. In other areas, and health and 
social care might be an example, there are very clear national standards. It is a very complex system. 
Achieving health and social care integration is something that everybody wants to achieve, but how 
quickly we can get there, given all the pressures on the system and the very serious considerations 
of making sure that the patient is well served through any change process, means that we are taking 
a more cautious approach in many ways. Manchester, with its very strong governance, built up over 
many years as you were saying earlier, is the place where the NHS and the Department of Health 
and Ministers have chosen to take a bigger step first. It depends a little bit on different areas.
Q43 Chair: Just picking up on that: if every area took on health—I know not all are—there 
would be some core purposes, agreed through your Department with the Government, about what 
that would mean for people locally, wouldn’t there? There are going to be some core purposes for 
some issues, if not necessarily for every area.
Melanie Dawes: Yes. Who knows? It is possible that we will see the Manchester model for 
health and social care in every area at some point in future, and we may well see it go further than it 
does today.
Q44 Chair: But they would have to adhere to national guidelines and approaches. There 
would be certain core basics that they would have to do. There will be some core purposes that the 
centre will have set previously that local areas will be happy to do; to do differently, maybe, but 
deliver the core purpose the same.
Melanie Dawes: Exactly. We will perhaps commission in different ways and integrate more 
budgets around the citizen in a different way. That is the opportunity that co-commissioning gives, 
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even if we are not actually devolving budgets or responsibilities, which is the case on health and 
social care.
Chair: I am going to bring in Nigel Mills, because we want to go a bit more into some of 
these areas. Nigel Mills, I will start with you, and then to Karin Smyth, both working together. 
Q45 Nigel Mills: Don’t you worry, Ms Dawes, that you are creating a bit of a mess? You are 
going to end up with some parts of the country having none of this and some having a lot, with all of 
them doing slightly different things. Is anyone going to actually know who is doing what, where, 
when and why?
Melanie Dawes: Well, I am a civil servant, so perhaps I am naturally tidy-minded. There are 
some people who say we should set out a clear national framework, but as you know, this is a policy 
decision that Ministers have taken. They want it to be bottom-up, to allow for more innovation, and 
to allow for areas to move at different paces, reflecting their own capability and clarity about the 
local partnerships that they wish to strike and believe that they can build new devolved powers on. 
The most important thing for me, and the reason why I am comfortable about this as 
accounting officer, is that we have the frameworks in place. We need to keep on top of those, and 
the LEPs Report that we have in front of us is a good example of where we have had to do more to 
make sure that those assurance frameworks are working properly. We put in place more work to 
make sure that that is happening, but it is the framework that gives me assurance that, overall, we 
know what is happening at the system level.
Q46 Nigel Mills: Don’t you think that, now you have got 10 or so of these deals, which are 
pretty consistent in a lot of things—there are some pilots and unique things—wouldn’t it be better 
to say transparently and up front, for future areas that want one of these deals, that these are the 
core things they can have, so everyone knows they can bid for smart ticketing and bus franchising 
and apprenticeship grants for employers and whatever else is in there. Wouldn’t that start to feel a 
little more consistent and considered?
Melanie Dawes: Sometimes I think we are damned if we do and damned if we don’t on this. 
You could take that table as arguing that, in fact, there is a lot of consistency out there already. Local 
areas talk to one another, and certainly from a system level, when you are talking about, for 
example, devolving transport budgets, there comes a point, which we have more or less reached, 
where the Department for Transport is very clear that a devolution deal has a certain offer on 
transport that it is very happy to support and make happen. 
We have a blend of things that are quite clear what the offer is. The investment fund is 
another example where it is pretty clear now what the offer is. We also have some clarity on the 
requirements, for example directly elected mayors. We are also trying to balance that with allowing 
scope for innovation, and we are still seeing that, but it doesn’t surprise me that we have some 
commonality, because in the end what drives growth are the things that we know about: skills, 
transport and so on. These are the budgets that are bound to be in play.
Q47 Nigel Mills: What is the plan when all the areas that voluntarily want this have come 
forward, and you have got 20% of the country who have said, “No, it’s not for us. We just don’t fancy 
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it,” “We can’t agree a geography,” or something? You will just say, “Well, look, it’s crazy now that 
Derbyshire hasn’t got this, so you will have to find a way of taking it, or we will just lump you in with 
someone else,” or will you be happy, in five years’ time, for some areas not to have this devolution? 
You would have a few a civil servants sitting around trying to remember how to do bus franchising, 
because you do not have to do it very much now, or something. Will that not be a real, structural 
effectiveness problem, if you are not careful?
Melanie Dawes: I don’t know the answer to that question yet. We shall see. It is still quite 
early in the Parliament. We have struck quite a lot of deals in quite a short space of time, and a 
number of areas are still talking to us about striking deals. Each time I go and talk to local 
government—I go out as much as I can, usually every week, to talk to local authorities and local 
business leaders—I feel that the debate is moving on and that people are getting more interested in 
this, not less. We could see quite considerable further movement on this during the course of this 
Parliament, but where we end up I do not know. It could be that this is a journey for quite a long 
time.
Q48 Chair: May I just chip in? One of the issues that we touched on earlier, which is quite 
interesting and potentially very concerning, is the geography. You talk about the deals being done, 
but we are already seeing some concerns, and some of that might be reflected around the table—
there is heavy East Anglian dominance on this Committee, for example. As Nigel Mills says, the 
geography does not always necessarily match up—you might have areas that are left outside, 
because they did not get in there early. That last lot, the last rump or the last half, might not be very 
coherent, but they might be forced to come together in a way that really does not make sense 
locally, or even nationally. Do you have any involvement in that? Because bottom-up does not 
always quite work; it may leave people out—I suppose that is the summary of that point.
Melanie Dawes: Simon might want to comment on this. Almost every area of the country is 
talking to us about the prospect of devolution, but at different levels and with different appetite 
right now. I think it is a good point: if you end up with a very small pocket that has been left out, that 
might be a concern. Equally, it might be a district council that just does not want to be a constituent 
member of any combined authority, which might be fine. It does not mean that the services will stop 
or that the council would be left out of the conversation altogether; mainly, it will be that it has just 
decided not to join in a wider package of devolution, but it would still be running its existing services. 
It is a fair challenge, but it is a little too early to say. 
Q49 Chair: Perhaps we can hear Simon Ridley on this, because I can see that it sounds easy 
from your level, but it might be very problematic if you are resident in a very small area that is not 
covered.
Simon Ridley: A lot of what Melanie has been saying is that it is really important that we are 
a year or so into a process, which will be going forward for a number more years, in terms of setting 
up the deals that have been agreed and talking to places without deals. There is a legislative 
framework in the recent Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 that provides the means 
by which areas that are not involved in a combined authority could join at a later date, if that is what 
they want to do, as well as the powers to form new combined authorities. There are a number of 
different ways in which the deals we have got and the discussions in other local areas could evolve 
over time. We are not, at any point, setting a map in stone that cannot develop as things emerge.
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Equally, the powers being devolved in each area and the members of the combined 
authorities are known, so the debates that are going on in different parts of the country are known 
locally. As we make decisions and go through the statutory processes, there are a number of points 
at which the implications for services and for residents are considered both locally and centrally. 
There is a wide scope for a number of different outcomes.
Q50 Mr Jackson: May I just challenge you with an example? Mr Bacon will know this, 
because he has taken an interest in East Anglian devolution as well. Cambridge City Council has 
refused to have any part, at the moment. I understand that that is because the Treasury was 
unwilling to give way on the issue of affordable housing, which is Cambridge’s No. 1 priority. You 
may say, “Well, they are a district council, so it doesn’t really matter that much”, but it is an 
economic powerhouse within East Anglia. My question to you is: how local is the devolution when 
someone like the leader of Cambridge City Council is saying, “We’re desperately short of housing. 
We need a deal on housing,” and the Treasury says, “That’s not in the package. Take it or leave it,” 
and the council walks away. It is a practical example.
Simon Ridley: It is important to recognise that the discussion across all the councils and 
leaders in East Anglia took place in the run-up to the announcement in the Budget of the East Anglia 
devolution deal. There is an aspect of that, to do with housing, which is different and bespoke to 
that area and is not common across all the other deals. It is critical that the partners who want to be 
part of the development and the implementation of that, the combined authority and the move 
towards the mayoral elections are consensual members. The Government is not forcing anybody to 
be part of the individual deals.
At the time of the Budget, Cambridge city did not sign the deal. We are continuing 
discussions with all the local partners as we take forward the work to implement that deal. We have 
not reached the statutory points of that process yet. We will keep discussing with all the partners to 
try to implement the deal. There is a proposal. A set of powers and funding are being devolved, a lot 
of which are bespoke to the area and unique to that agreement, particularly on housing. The local 
authorities that want to sign up have done so.
Q51 Mr Jackson: Yes, but it’s a mess, isn’t it? You have Cambridgeshire County Council 
saying, “There’s not enough information. Go away and come back with more information.” Norfolk, 
Norwich City Council and Peterborough City Council are doing the same. Breckland are saying, “No, 
we don’t want to do it.” Why was there not more collaboration, discussion and debate before this 
was announced? It is very unusual for all these local authorities to flatly refuse the present deal on 
offer.
Simon Ridley: There was a great deal of collaboration beforehand. This deal was worked up 
between the Government and the local partners. The local partners agreed to the deal—Cambridge 
city excepted—at the time of the Budget. There is a lot of complexity in developing the details of 
implementation, in setting up the combined authority and in that many partners coming together 
and finding new ways of working. We are working closely with all the local areas in that regard, as 
officials, to make sure they understand the processes. 
Oral evidence: Cities and Local Growth, HC 913 19
Q52 Chair: Sorry—perhaps you could answer Mr Jackson’s point. You say they were set, but 
they are not agreeing the deals now, so there is some unravelling.
Simon Ridley: There is an ongoing discussion about implementing the deal.
Q53 Mr Jackson: They signed the letter because the Treasury said, “If you know what’s good 
for you, sign the letter,” basically.
Simon Ridley: Nobody has forced anybody to sign the letter. People have signed the letter 
on the basis of the deal that was agreed.
Mr Jackson: “Something might happen to your university in Peterborough—a tragedy might 
befall it—if you don’t sign the letter.”
Chair: We may be straying into political pressure territory, which is not Mr Ridley’s bag.
Simon Ridley: There was a development of a document that underpinned the deal, which 
the signatories and local leaders at the time felt they could agree to. We are continuing to take that 
forward. Some councils have had further local discussions and feel that, in different ways, the deal 
might not now be what they want to sign up to. We have not reached the statutory process to set up 
the combined authority that will be needed to get to mayoral elections in 2017, but we continue to 
work with all the partners on that. Everybody knows what is part of the deal.
Chair: We are going to come back to some of these specific issues. Did the Comptroller and 
Auditor General want to come in?
Sir Amyas Morse: No.
Q54 Nigel Mills: Will people in Cambridge get to vote for the mayor if their council has 
opted out, or is the opt-out irrelevant in that situation?
Simon Ridley: One of the critical things in setting up the combined authority is to determine 
the area. In setting up the combined authority, all the councils involved have to sign up to the area. 
The combined authority would not cover the area of the city of Cambridge on the basis that they 
were not signed up to it, so they would not be voting for the mayor.
Q55 Nigel Mills: An island of non-representation. So even though the upper-tier 
authority in an area signs up, the lower tier does not sign up. Is that right?
Simon Ridley: In setting up a combined authority, yes. Subsequently, it is possible to join.
Q56 Stephen Phillips: Coming back to the point that Mr Mills was making earlier—indeed, if 
you listened to the earlier witnesses and take this example, of which I was unaware—how could you 
have a devolution deal for Cambridgeshire that did not include the city of Cambridge, which is 
obviously the urban centre and the centre of the county?
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Simon Ridley: That is a matter for all the individual councils that sign up to the deal and for 
Cambridge city, and for ministerial consideration.
Q57 Stephen Phillips: From the perspective of DCLG sitting here in London, presumably 
scratching your heads, it doesn’t make any sense, does it? Even if, because she is a civil servant, you 
do not want Ms Dawes’s perfection of coterminous everything, not to have Cambridge as part of the 
Cambridgeshire devolution deal would seem very strange and possibly counterproductive.
Melanie Dawes: Everyone would like the city of Cambridge to be part of the deal, but in the 
end this is a bottom-up approach. Nobody is going to force Cambridge to join if it does not wish to.
Q58 Stephen Phillips: But it’s not that bottom-up, is it? We did not want a mayor in 
Lincolnshire and you forced us to have one.
Melanie Dawes: I don’t think anyone from central Government is forcing a deal on a local 
area.
Q59 Stephen Phillips: All right, let me put it slightly differently, you can have a devolution 
deal, but only if you have a mayor. None of us—by which I mean pretty much all the Lincolnshire 
Members, the county council and all the local authorities—wanted a mayor, but if we wanted our 
devolution deal, we were told we had to have one. Why was that, Ms Dawes?
Melanie Dawes: As you have described, the offer that is on the table is for a combined 
authority with a directly elected mayor. The reason for that—in the end, it is a matter of policy—
goes back to what you were hearing from the witnesses in the earlier session. It is about having 
stronger local accountability, so that the Government can feel confident about devolving bigger 
powers. If that opens the way for further devolution, that is the prize that local areas are signing up 
to.
Q60 Stephen Phillips: I understand that. I do not want to get into policy with you. I am 
taking issue with your suggestion that this is all bottom-up. In circumstances where we wanted 
something that neither DCLG nor the Treasury were prepared to give us, it was not all bottom-up, 
was it?
Melanie Dawes: It is a political negotiation—
Q61 John Pugh: But not a bottom-up one.
Melanie Dawes: I think it is a bottom-up approach.
Q62 Stephen Phillips: Bottom-up, provided that you agree with central Government.
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Melanie Dawes: This is about local areas coming forward with their proposals and then 
entering into a negotiation with central Government Ministers about striking a deal.
Q63 Chair: We are in danger of straying into policy, but to take Mr Phillips’s point to its 
logical conclusion, had greater Lincolnshire—the 10 authorities, the county and the other two—
decided on and come up with a clear, solid, accountable approach about how they would work 
together to ensure that you could be sure that money was being spent properly, that they were 
accountable and that local people understood who was accountable, would DCLG entertain that? I 
know that you have a Government policy, so it is perhaps tricky for you to answer, but would that be 
something you would have entertained? Isn’t it the accountability that is important, rather than the 
structure? Isn’t that what you just said when you said the mayor is there for accountability reasons?
Melanie Dawes: We don’t have a view about a particular correct answer for local areas. 
Those answers are emerging out of a process of negotiation. They are starting with proposals that 
local areas are putting forward themselves. Often, the local MPs have a view as well, and there is a 
process of political negotiation that leads to a deal being signed.
Q64 Chair: Perhaps that gives Mr Phillips a little door to push at. Good luck, Mr Phillips.
Before I go back to Nigel Mills and Karin Smyth and while are discussing Cambridgeshire, I 
want to ask about something else. This is referred to in a number of places in the Report, but I am 
looking particularly at figure 8 in part three on page 35, which shows a map of the west midlands 
deal that summarises some of the issues that Mr Jackson and others were raising about Cambridge. 
It also shows prospective non-constituent members—in this case Stratford-upon-Avon. Mr Ridley, 
can you explain what is meant by a non-constituent member, because it isn’t entirely clear to me? 
Perhaps I am just slow.
Simon Ridley: It essentially means that you are a member of the combined authority but 
have not voted to be a full constituent member, which basically means that you have lesser voting 
rights and less of an influence on the decisions of a combined authority1. You are sort of round the 
table but not as a full member.
Q65 Chair: So what do you lose out on by not being a full member?
Simon Ridley: Essentially, there is the same degree of influence over the decisions of the 
combined authority that are made—
Q66 Chair: Your residents don’t vote for the mayor.
Simon Ridley: They do not.
1 Clarification from DCLG: You may have lesser voting rights and less of an influence on the decisions of a 
combined authority
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Q67 Chair: And what do you not get in other ways? You sit round the table and you have 
some of the same powers but not all, you said.
Simon Ridley: The combined authority is a statutory entity, effectively like a local authority, 
that is governed by a membership and that can determine policy in the various areas devolved to it, 
based on a set of voting and governance arrangements that are determined locally—a two-thirds 
majority to do this that or the other. As a non-constituent member, you have less or no voting to 
finally influence the decision. You are part of the discussion and you can represent the interests of 
your area directly, but you do not have the same level of decision-making power.
Q68 Stephen Phillips: Like Norway or Switzerland in the Councils of the EU. 
Simon Ridley: It depends on the way the local area is set up.
Chair: That’s a bit beyond Mr Ridley’s area of expertise. He is a very clever mandarin, no 
doubt, but let’s leave him out of Europe for now. We’re going to come on to European funding in a 
moment. 
Q69 Karin Smyth: In our earlier statements—unfortunately, we were a bit late, so Lord 
Porter had to leave—we heard the view that devolution in itself is a good thing, so we should let it 
happen. We also heard from the professor that objectives really matter. We didn’t have time to 
interrogate that, but there are two slightly different views on that. He also talked quite a lot about 
outcomes. You said that you are letting that journey unfold and that you perhaps don’t know how 
it’s going to go. If we have an elected mayor in May next year, when will we have clear objectives for 
all of these deals? How are you going to measure them?
My final point is this. When we talked, a couple of weeks ago, about accountably for 
taxpayers’ money, Sir Nicholas Macpherson talked quite a lot about your thinking in the 
Department, and we talked a lot about the fact that the data is not good at these levels. Can you talk 
to us about the objectives and when we will have them, and about the data at a local and a national 
level? 
Melanie Dawes: That’s a very good question. There are a number of different elements to it. 
Perhaps I can start by talking about the objectives for devolution as a whole, rather than in any 
individual area, because that, I think, is partly where Lord Porter was coming from. It is true that 
we’ve not set out a set of metrics by which the Government, at the macro level for the whole of 
England, expects to be judged in relation to devolution. I’m not sure that we’ve ever had any set of 
objectives for the centralised approach that we’ve lived with for many decades. In a sense, that is a 
policy decision. The Government made the decision that we can do better by devolving and giving 
more power to locally elected representatives, rather than doing everything at the centre in 
Whitehall.
When it comes to individual deals—and, indeed, individual Growth Deals, which were struck 
prior to the devolution deals that we are now talking about—we have put in place a framework that 
will allow for some evaluation against some agreed objectives. For example, in the case of the 
growth fund2, we have agreed with every local enterprise partnership what their outcomes3 are and 
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what their trajectory is for the projects that they are expecting to deliver. We now have an aligned 
set of measurements of data—things like jobs created, homes built and so on—which is being used 
in every area, rather than the varied approach that we had at the beginning. There, we can be clear 
what the local growth funding is aiming to achieve, and we are tracking progress against those aims. 
When it comes to devolution deals, in some areas we will have clarity about precise 
outcomes. For example, on housing, if we are able to agree a final deal in East Anglia, the housing 
element of that may well go with some specific house-building targets for that area, because we are 
essentially ring-fencing some of our national funding on housing for that deal area. We will almost 
certainly be agreeing some precise numbers there as part of that deal.
Q70 Mr Bacon: On that point, there have been a lot of housing targets over the last 10 to 20 
years. What evidence do you have that housing targets work?
Melanie Dawes: The ultimate evidence is whether or not they are achieved. 
Q71 Mr Bacon: Right. To restate my question, what evidence do you have that housing 
targets work?
Melanie Dawes: Where we’ve had individual programmes in the Department—Ms Smyth, I 
hope you don’t mind if I just answer this question—as we did in the last Parliament, for example, on 
the number of affordable homes that would be built, we have achieved those targets. There’s quite 
a good track record, actually, of delivering against them. 
Q72 Mr Bacon: I was thinking of the 109,500 potential houses, which you will be deeply 
familiar with by now. You gave us a sample piece of paper that suggested that on 100 of the 942 
sites, a few hundred houses had been completed out of the 109,500 potential houses. What 
evidence do you have that housing targets work?
Melanie Dawes: I had a feeling that you might be referring to public sector land, Mr Bacon. 
Q73 Mr Bacon: Not only that, actually. There have been lots of targets; there were targets in 
the Barker report. It wasn’t a point about a particular political party. There have been lots of targets 
under all parties of all political persuasions. I’m just interested what evidence DCLG has that housing 
targets work.
Melanie Dawes: The objective of the public sector land programme was to release the land. 
Without rehearsing in too much detail what we have discussed before, that target was met. There 
are some questions about including sites prior to the programme starting and so on, but I think we 
understand about the land release elements of that.
2 Clarification from DCLG: Local growth fund 
3 Clarification from DCLG: outputs rather than outcomes
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Q74 Mr Bacon: Housing targets are really what I’m asking about.
Melanie Dawes: The figures that we sent you, in an attempt to shed some light on this, 
show that, for sites where we have judged at the point of sale that homes were on track to be built, 
when we look back at them some years later, they are still on track. If anything, more homes are 
going to be built than were planned at the time we sold the sites. Those data were a snapshot; they 
only actually related to sites where no homes had already been started.
Q75 Mr Bacon: That was not the purpose of my question. You mentioned housing targets; 
you seemed to say that, with the new deal and with the new local authority structure—perhaps a 
combined authority—there would be housing targets. I wanted to know what evidence there is over 
the last 10 to 20 years of attempts by the centre to impose housing targets, and what evidence there 
is that housing targets have produced the required result.
Melanie Dawes: Programme by programme, I think we have the evidence that individual 
programme objectives have been met or have not been met.
Q76 Mr Bacon: But there’s a huge gap, isn’t there?
Melanie Dawes: Has that been sufficient to tackle the nation’s housing shortage? No, it has 
not. We have an undersupply of housing in this country—I think we agree on that.
Chair: We are going to park this now, because we have some other issues on housing, 
because the Manchester deal has housing funding, which we will come back to. I want to go back to 
Karin Smyth.
Melanie Dawes: I was halfway through my answer. I was trying to explain how we will know 
whether devolution deals have been successful; I was saying that in some areas we will have 
quantified targets, possibly on housing, in the case of East Anglia, but in many other areas what I 
hope we will see is mayors coming forward with manifestos on how they will use these powers. At 
our last hearing, you rightly pointed out to us that we need to make sure that all the work we are 
doing in central Government with local authorities has some resonance at some point for local 
people, so that that democratic process can have some reality and can have some life breathed into 
it. What we are doing at the moment to try to make that happen is agreeing with every single deal 
area what its implementation plan is at the high level—although, as I said, in some cases, that will be 
for local politicians to decide further down the line. We are making sure that there is a clear 
accountability statement for every deal area, so that those of us who are accountable know what we 
are accountable for. The next task will be to make sure that there is a clear communication plan of 
what those new powers are at the local level, so that that democratic process can have some clarity 
to it and can then become real in a way that is significant for local people.
Q77 Nigel Mills: But no general growth targets? You are not going to say, “For this 
devolution deal, your target is x thousand jobs or x percentage growth in the local economy.”
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Melanie Dawes: No, we have not asked for that with the devolution deals. That is a policy 
decision: not to try to require that to be set up.
Q78 Nigel Mills: Except you sort of have, haven’t you?
Melanie Dawes: We have in some cases.
Q79 Nigel Mills: Because the £30 million—generally, it is £30 million, for all the deals bar 
two, I think—is for 30 years, but with a five-year assessment of how that area has contributed to 
national growth. So, presumably, there must be some measure there: “Your area has not grown 
enough,” or “Your area has grown enough.”
Melanie Dawes: We are just putting the final touches at the moment to the procurement 
for that independent panel evaluation that you referred to. That is quite an important part of the 
evaluation for the devolution deals—in particular, for the investment fund. That evaluation will take 
place in five years’ time, when there have been enough years to judge the success of policies that 
have not yet been put into place. It will inform the Government’s decision to release further 
tranches of funding in those 30-year costs.
Q80 Nigel Mills: What you are saying is, “We won’t set you a target that you know, that you 
can work to and that you can independently assess to understand whether you are hitting it or what 
has gone wrong. Every five years some random committee, whose make-up we don’t know, is going 
to do some kind of assessment and make some sort of recommendation, based on some sort of 
criteria that are not very transparent, on whether you get to keep your £30 million for the next five 
years or whether you lose it.” Is that not worse than having a target?
Catherine Frances: In the case of the investment fund that is going to different areas, there 
has been a conscious attempt not to dictate from the centre what local areas would spend that 
money on, because that is a set of decisions that will have to be made down the line, and it is quite 
appropriate that that is the case. What we and CLG have worked on together is a sense that we need 
to be robustly and independently evaluating what is being delivered and what the benefits are in 
terms of economic growth. In a sense, we need to be trying to capture some kind of economic 
growth measurement and asking independent academics to do so, because they are best qualified 
to do so. It needs to be designed for us not simply to look at a set of output measures, but to look at 
the overarching outcomes that we can see from that investment. 
I also make the point that the Department, in releasing the funding, has worked up an 
assurance framework for single pot money—that is a set of money that goes to the devolution 
deals—to ensure that each local area has a value-for-money framework up front. The combination 
of those things is fairly robust and quite innovative, actually.
Q81 Caroline Flint: Who is going to do the auditing in all that? It is great to hear about being 
robust and independently evaluated, but apart from an academic study, who will do the auditing?
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Simon Ridley: I think it is probably worth taking half a step back. We will be devolving a set 
of money that includes the investment fund to each of the combined authorities. We are asking 
them to have a local assurance framework, so that the projects they determine and the means by 
which they determine their investment strategies are based on some economic assessments. They 
have the kind of rigour to do that. Beyond that, for the investment funds specifically, there is an 
independent assessment of the economic impact of that to provide some assurance, because this is 
still money flowing from the centre. Combined authorities will then be audited locally, as local 
authorities, in the same way that councils are. They will be auditing their budgets and their finances.
Q82 Chair: Are they audited for proper propriety, not for value for money? Local 
government auditors are not—
Simon Ridley: So, the money will be seen through the independent assessment of the 
economic impact of the investments that the combined authority is making.
Q83 Karin Smyth: Is that by you coming here or by some combination of them going 
somewhere locally?
Melanie Dawes: We are procuring a pretty cutting-edge economic assessment. A panel will 
do that work. It is quite a complicated economic assessment, because it requires you to work out in 
quite a complex landscape what the different interventions will have achieved. That will all be very 
open and transparent. It is a very major piece of work. It is not something that is a small or minor 
piece of work at all. I think it is quite a significant investment, actually.
Q84 John Pugh: I just want to clarify a factual point. The £30 million standard bond that 
Nigel just referred to, which is what comes with most city region deals—you referred to it is as a 
fund—is it invariably just a revenue sum, or is it part revenue, part capital or what?
Simon Ridley: It varies slightly between the deals. It is largely revenue. Sometimes it is a 
mixture of revenue and capital.
Q85 John Pugh: So it can be revenue and capital, as long as it adds up to £30 million.
Simon Ridley: Yes.
Catherine Frances: The individual deals have a slightly different balance of capital and 
revenue as a result of the negotiations that happened with each place.
Q86 John Pugh: It all adds up to £30 million.
Catherine Frances: It adds up to the figures in the NAO Report, which are not £30 million in 
all cases.
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Sir Amyas Morse: I just wanted to ask something. Supposing things were not going 
according to plan—I am sure they will, but supposing they did not—how fast would you know about 
it? In other words, you are in a position where you have not set targets and you are waiting to see, 
and I can understand you wanting to wait to see whether the economic benefits are delivered. I 
remember looking at some previous growth plans where people optimistically set up sites where 
nothing was going on at that moment and people just built industrial buildings where no one ever 
came to do any business and nothing very much happened. I hope that won’t happen, but supposing 
that something happened that was clearly, setting aside the economic assessment, just plain not 
good practice or not working in anyone’s money—how soon are you going to know about that? How 
big has the noise got to get before you start being able to react to things of that sort? I may not have 
picked that up from the discussions so far.
Melanie Dawes: Where this is a truly devolved power—for example the investment fund or 
some areas of skills, which are going to be operating in a much more devolved landscape than they 
are today once the devolution deals have been implemented—we come back to the power of local 
scrutiny. That is why all combined authorities are required to have much stronger scrutiny 
committees. I think that is an incredibly important part of this landscape. 
Q87 Caroline Flint: I think the power of local scrutiny committees is a pretty mixed bag. I 
declare an interest: my husband is a councillor, and he is the chair of a committee of the council. 
They do not have independent support to their work; it is usually a senior departmental officer. Try 
though they might—and they do—there is very little resource in lots of local authorities to provide 
that sort of independent evaluation in the same way as our Select Committees have.
Melanie Dawes: We will be coming forward with proposals on this in the next few months. 
It is one of the requirements of the Act that we put in place stronger scrutiny arrangements, and I 
think it is a very important part of the framework that this really does work. I take your point that, at 
the moment, it isn’t strong enough. 
Q88 Chair: Maybe Karin Smyth wants to come in on this as well, but many of us have been in 
local government. A number of us have been through the different models, including the scrutiny 
models. I am not decrying my colleagues in local government, who do a good job, but inevitably, 
because of the resourcing, they will look at a slice of public service but could miss a huge other area. 
They also do not have a local equivalent of the NAO, because the audit of local government is purely 
on finance and not value for money. 
Bear in mind—one of your predecessors spoke about this—that when Oxfordshire was 
looking for independent members for its new audit panel, under the new arrangements, they could 
find only one person in Oxfordshire. I wouldn’t want to decry Don Valley—there may be a lot more 
people willing to do it in Don Valley—but if in an area like Oxfordshire it is hard, I imagine it must be 
hard in other parts of the country. There is a serious capability gap there, is there not?
Q89 Mr Jackson: Can I say, Ms Dawes, as you will well remember, although the meeting was 
truncated, we were here five months ago talking about fire and rescue services and fire authorities, 
which are also combined authorities. I went through a litany of what I would call dodgy practice, and 
one example in particular where, although you did have oversight and scrutiny, it did not work, to 
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the extent that your predecessor and Ministers were writing to them about their financial practices 
and the remuneration of the chief officers, and they completely ignored you. If you extrapolate that 
into these big combined authorities, I am very concerned that, without an audit commission, there 
will not be appropriate oversight and scrutiny.
Melanie Dawes: This is very important, and I hope that you will challenge us when we come 
forward with our proposals to make sure that they are strong enough. 
Q90 Caroline Flint: When will that be?
Melanie Dawes: It will be very shortly—in the next few months. 
Chair: We will do pre-scrutiny, if you like.
Melanie Dawes: We are currently in local government purdah, so it will not be in the next 
week or so.
Q91 Caroline Flint: Before the summer recess?
Melanie Dawes: I hope so, yes, but that will be a decision for Ministers as to when they 
bring them forward.
Q92 Caroline Flint: Are they well advanced?
Melanie Dawes: Yes, they are.
Q93 Chair: We will look forward and willingly find a gap in our diary to do that. 
Melanie Dawes: What we are trying to avoid here is a situation where central Government 
have a hair-trigger and jump in too quickly. If we are going to devolve, we have to recognise that we 
are taking some different risks here, and that is part of what we are trying to achieve. I am under no 
illusion that we need to make sure that these local arrangements are really strong. We also need to 
make sure that the political process works really well, and that there is clarity for local electorates 
about something meaningful that they are voting on when they are electing mayors next spring.
Q94 Karin Smyth: That leads neatly into my follow-up question, because you said something 
very interesting about mayors and manifestos. It is helpful to think through the process of timing. 
After the local elections, the areas that have been offered devolution deals will come back by July 
and say whether or not they accept them. Is that right?
Melanie Dawes: Simon may be best-placed to set out the process.
Simon Ridley: Would it be helpful if I went through the high-level timeline? All deals have to 
come forward before the summer with what is known as a governance scheme4, which is the detail 
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of how the combined authority will be set up, where it needs to be set up, the voting arrangements 
and, crucially, the powers that will be devolved to the combined authority and the mayor. That is 
then essentially consulted on through the summer—
Q95 Karin Smyth: Consulted on in Government? Or for the electorate to look at?
Simon Ridley: No, it is published and produced locally. The local area then presents the 
scheme or writes to the Secretary of State, who then has to consider it and determine it, and we 
then need to produce an order. That will happen in September or October. That order gets laid 
before Parliament and made by Parliament, and we want to have that in place six months5 ahead of 
the elections for the mayors, which are at the beginning of November6. Then there is a period into 
the election. 
Q96 Karin Smyth: It is incredibly tight. 
Simon Ridley: It is a challenging timescale. 
Q97 Karin Smyth: In November the local area will have agreed what is in there; what they 
are prepared to do; how they will sort out governance locally; and which local authorities are in or 
out—we had a problem in Bristol that some may be in or out—and that is the deal. We then have an 
election with a mayoral manifesto about what that mayor will want to do. So it is not just accepting 
the deal but saying what the mayor would like to see and how they would like to see that go further 
forward. So in May, when a mayor is elected who says, “I want to have an authority that does much 
more than this—health and so on,” they will come back to you and negotiate further. Is that how 
you see the journey progressing?
Melanie Dawes: It is possible that you will see powerful local mayors coming and asking us 
for more. We have agreed more with Manchester since the November 2014 deal: they have come 
back and challenged us in a number of areas and in successive decisions we have given them more. 
It is entirely possible that that will happen.
Q98 Caroline Flint: Has that happened with police and crime commissioners?
Melanie Dawes: That is a slightly different context, in that they have taken on 
responsibilities that were already there. 
Q99 Caroline Flint: They are elected, though, aren’t they?
4 Clarification from DCLG: governance review and scheme
5 Clarification from DCLG: they want to have laid the orders in six months rather than have it in place
6 Clarification from DCLG: elections will be in May 2017 
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Melanie Dawes: Yes, they are.
Q100 Stephen Phillips: But they were elected on very small turnouts, weren’t they?
Melanie Dawes: Yes.
Q101 Stephen Phillips: So we will have these very powerful mayors in these combined 
authorities where there are devolution deals. Are you not worried that, rather like police and crime 
commissioners, local people will not understand that they are quite powerful people and only one in 
five of them will go to the election?
Melanie Dawes: This is a new part of the political landscape and I am sure it will evolve and 
strengthen. We have seen, though, in the last couple of decades how the London mayoralty, despite 
still being a very young institution in its current form, has developed into being a prize that is 
seriously worth having, that people do really care about—
Q102 Stephen Phillips: There is a general understanding that the London Mayor has got a lot 
of power and he is quite important in London. If I go and knock on doors in Thorpe on the Hill, where 
I live, and ask people, “You know we’re going to have an elected mayor?” they will say, “Oh yes, we 
know there’s going to be an elected mayor for Lincolnshire.” I will ask, “What powers will he have?” 
but they will not have any idea at all. They will think it will be someone who will turn out in a nice 
chain, a red dressing-gown and a tricorn hat—
Chair: I think you mean a red robe. We don’t want to upset—
Stephen Phillips: No, I mean a red dressing-gown, and a nice tricorn hat at the appropriate 
moment. [Interruption.] Forgive me; there is a serious point here. How are you going to get the 
message out there that these elections will be very important?
Melanie Dawes: To be clear, we will not be prescribing what mayors should wear from 
central Government, but I think it is a very fair challenge: we do need to make sure that local areas—
the combined authorities will have been set up by this stage—do a great deal to communicate with 
their local communities what is on offer and what is at stake. 
I think we will see successful mayoral models growing over time and becoming genuine 
figureheads, which can attract more concessions from central Government over time, if I can put it 
as boldly as that. We have seen the mayor in Bristol operate in a successful way over the last few 
years, although obviously a new model is being introduced beyond that. There is certainly no lack of 
a sense of responsibility.
Q103 Chair: I am aware of the time. There is a lot of enthusiasm in the room both ways on 
the subject, so I urge colleagues to ask tight questions and ask you, Ms Dawes, to be a little briefer in 
your answers. Others should indicate if they want to make brief points. 
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Q104 Mr Bacon: While we are on the point of any elected mayor, the money and the 
powers, could you clarify something? Figure 6 in the devolution deals Report says that many areas in 
the devolution deals have got exactly £30 million, and East Anglia is one of them. I am looking at 
page 72 of the Red Book, which refers to the devolution deal with East Anglia having a “£900m 
gainshare pot,” which, conveniently, would be £30 million a year over 30 years, but it adds, “£175m 
ring-fenced housing fund and devolved transport and adult skills budget,” which would take one up 
to £1.075 billion. Then there is £151 million on top of that for river crossings at Lowestoft and 
Ipswich, £50 million for a new world-leading centre for food and health research at Norwich, and £5 
million to redevelop St Albans City rail station. The total in the Red Book for the East Anglia deal 
appears to be either £1.281 billion or, if those last three that I mentioned are, as it were, 
preordained, the £900 million plus the £175 million, so £1.075 billion. Were it to happen and come 
forward, the elected mayor, whoever it is, presumably would sit over a four-year period. Would it?
Simon Ridley: Yes.
Q105 Mr Bacon: So you certainly do not want to tell the locally elected mayor what to spend 
the money on. The amount is either £30 million or slightly more than that, multiplied by 30 years but 
really, effectively, the next four years. You are talking about roughly £160 million or £170 million-ish 
over those four years. Are you saying that that elected mayor person will have complete autonomy 
over what that £150 million or £160 million gets spent on?
Melanie Dawes: Not complete autonomy, no. This is operating within the framework of a 
combined authority with other local leaders as part of that.
Simon Ridley: Yes. The combined authority locally would have complete power to determine 
an investment strategy based on that fund. Where that fund is revenue, they have scope to use it for 
borrowing, for transport investment—
Q106 Mr Bacon: How will the revenue-capital split be decided?
Simon Ridley: It is in the individual deals, dependent on what was agreed. The decision 
making will depend on the precise governance of the individual combined authorities. The mayor, 
clearly, is the lead of that. He or she will need to agree it with the whole combined authority, but 
there is no central Government input into what that investment strategy is; it is determined entirely 
by the combined authority.
Q107 Mr Bacon: Right. I am slightly puzzled. I am trying to understand the rationale for an 
elected mayor, really. You said in your earlier answer that it was something to do with giving central 
Government the confidence to devolve more of these powers. There was a time, many years ago, 
when local government had a lot more confidence and power and central Government did less. 
Local authorities—Birmingham, Bolton, Norwich and whoever—issued bonds in the markets and 
then did things as a result of raising the money. That was without all these extra layers. What is the 
rationale that says you must have an elected extra layer—effectively, a fourth tier of government—
in order to make this happen?
Melanie Dawes: It is a policy decision. Ministers have been very clear that this was part of 
their manifesto. 
Oral evidence: Cities and Local Growth, HC 913 32
Q108 Mr Bacon: I am not questioning the policy; I am asking you to explain why there is a 
need for this.
Melanie Dawes: I agree with you that there have been times in its history when local 
government has done more. This is a policy decision that Ministers have made, that investing in 
strong political leadership in an area will galvanise a stronger relationship with central Government, 
yes, but also the ability to pull local people together around a common agenda. There is some 
evidence that mayors have been successful in other countries in driving that more sub-regional or 
city-based growth strategy, partly from a political level and partly simply in terms of policy.
Q109 Chair: Well, we have had a very mixed picture in the UK. We will not go through all of 
that, but I have a very good mayor in my area—
Simon Ridley: Chair, may I add quickly to Melanie’s answer? The other key point here is that 
the local area is setting up a combined authority across a functional economic area, bringing 
together a large number of other local authorities, so it is providing a clarity of leadership for the 
agenda across an area that actually involves multiple local authorities. As we get into those 
geographies, it is the clarity of that decision making that is key.
Q110 Chair: What if you get a mad or bad mayor who does something terribly wrong? Do 
you think they are going to be held in check by the leaders of the local authorities? When do you 
intervene? You talked about risk earlier, Ms Dawes. What is your assessment of where risk will lie?
Melanie Dawes: What that dynamic between the locally elected leaders will be is a good 
question. Simon is quite right that this is about the combined authority and the mayor. It is not just 
the mayor that is the additional governance; it is both. That is a good question. It remains to be 
seen. I cannot imagine, though, that local council leaders within the combined authority are going to 
be sitting quietly and saying nothing if they disagree with where a mayor is coming from. But in the 
end, mayors will have an electoral mandate, which they will also be bringing to the table. So I would 
imagine that this is going to be quite an active debate, but it is hard to predict that from where we 
sit here.
Q111 Chair: Just to be clear, can a mayor impose a two thirds majority requirement, because 
Simon Ridley mentioned that?
Simon Ridley: In the main, there is a requirement of a majority around the combined 
authority. The precise way in which that majority is achieved and the precise proportion of it will 
differ local area by local area, through the deals, but the mayor has to operate, essentially, under the 
control of the majority of the combined authority.
Chair: We will probably come back to this. I want to bring Nigel Mills back and then Karin 
Smyth, if you have got anything else.
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Q112 Nigel Mills: Finally, we will try to move on to look at local capability to deliver this 
change. I was looking at the experience of the local enterprise partnerships. What is your 
assessment of how well LEPs have worked? How effectively do they operate? Are you confident in 
their performance?
Melanie Dawes: Yes, I am confident in LEPs’ overall performance. What we have seen them 
do over the last few years is pull together in some areas very strong strategic economic plans, which 
have persuaded us to invest quite significantly in Growth Deals. Where they have worked really 
strongly in partnership with the local political leadership, we have seen particularly persuasive 
arguments in favour of devolution deals. That has not happened in every area; some LEPs are not as 
strong as others and in some areas the local political leadership has not been as willing to engage 
them, so it is not a uniform picture, but are they making a difference? Yes, they definitely are.
I said at the very beginning that it is really important that we have the framework in place. I 
think we have put in place a good framework for local enterprise partnerships. The assurance 
framework we began to audit the moment we put it in—so we required LEPs to put in frameworks in 
April 2015, and we included a plan to audit as part of DCLG’s 2015-16 internal audit plan, whether 
anything was actually happening on the ground. That work took place in 2015 and early into this 
year, at the same time as the NAO’s fieldwork was taking place. It was very helpful in telling us 
where LEPs were not putting in place the framework. We have now acted on that and have required 
LEPs individually—we have told them where their failings were; we have written to them individually 
and required them to come back again and tell us through their section 151 officers, who are 
accountable, what steps they are taking and to confirm that they have addressed those failings as 
we start this new financial year.
Q113 Nigel Mills: Do you think that 39 is the right number?
Melanie Dawes: Broadly the right number? Yes. Again, that is to some extent a policy 
decision, but it fits with the evidence that we have. We may well see some change. Some LEPs are 
talking about coming together, but equally we might see some that are quite large.
Q114 Nigel Mills: But there is none that you think you will forcibly merge.
Melanie Dawes: No, we do not have a strong view here. In any event, if LEPs think they 
could do a better job if they slightly change their boundaries, we would be happy to listen to that.
Q115 Nigel Mills: Page 28 of the LEP Report sets out that the Government chose to band 
local enterprise partnerships for the Growth Deal—in effect based on their governance 
arrangements—into ones that would have low flexibility, ones that would be medium and ones that 
would be high. Presumably that banding means that some were a bit more risky to give money to 
than others, so you have to try and control what they did with it, and some you were prepared to 
trust completely to decide what they did with it. Is that banding reflected in the devolution deals, as 
to whether you thought, “That was a higher-risk LEP, so we’re not going to do a devolution deal with 
that area,” or have you left these things completely separate?
Simon Ridley: It is neither one nor the other, in the sense that there are no rules such that 
whether a LEP is in a particular band it means they can or cannot have a devolution deal. Devolution 
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deals are proposed between the LEPs and local authorities and are discussed on that basis. Clearly, 
as we are discussing the devolution deals with places, we are also discussing with them how we will 
implement the deals, how we will take the deal forward, and the capacity locally, but the 
fundamentals of the deal depend on the political and LEP leadership in that area, and agreement 
with Government.
Q116 Nigel Mills: Do you not worry quite significantly if an LEP has been there for five years 
and you are not all that confident in its governance, so you want to be relatively restrictive on how it 
can use money it has now bid for? Would you not think, “Well, I’m not sure local arrangements are 
quite strong enough here for us to proceed”?
Simon Ridley: The first thing I would say is that I would not overstate in the low-flexibility 
group, and some of the LEPs that we—you know, there is a sort of—kind of, incredibly, kind of 
fundamental concerns. Secondly, there are a relatively small number of LEPs in that category. 
Clearly, as we are working with places, as we implement devolution deals and establish the various 
mechanisms that we have talked about, we are discussing with local areas and combined authorities 
questions of capability, and local areas will want to deliver and generate the gains from that 
investment. So it is an ongoing conversation, as quite new bodies continue to develop. 
Q117 Nigel Mills: I guess the feeling from the NAO Report, if I am going to give a quick 
summary, was that the NAO was not quite sure that governance and accountability arrangements—
everything—were in place, tested and audited, to be very confident that these relationships and 
structures were always working how we want them to. And yet we seem to be doing something 
similar, with a fair bit more money involved, without even trying to make sure we have fixed the 
weaker ones. 
Melanie Dawes: It is perhaps important to make two points here. One is that the LEPs’ role 
is strategic, so their role is to come up with the local economic plan and to engage the local business 
community on it as widely as they can to work on it in partnership with the local authorities. 
However, for the most part they are not delivery bodies; they rely on their local partners and a lot of 
capability in local Government to oversee the delivery.
It was on that basis that we judged that the right thing to do was to go ahead with the first 
year of the local growth fund, as we were putting in place the framework of assurance, but to audit 
it immediately, so that we could immediately test for any weaknesses and identify what they were, 
and then act on them quickly, which is what we’ve done. So it was a conscious decision to go ahead, 
but to test straightaway. 
Q118 Nigel Mills: So the LEPs rely for their success on the delivery by their local partners—
the local councils—because not that much private sector money has come in, has it? And those 
same councils will be the ones that are there to hold to account the mayor and presumably deliver 
most of what he wants to do, seeing as he or she will not have much of their own resource or teams 
or capacity. Effectively, it is the same people in the same local authorities who are trying to be the 
delivery mechanisms for both, at a time when they are facing quite significant funding challenges. 
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Do you actually have confidence that there will be the skilled people on the ground to 
implement smart ticketing and the buses thing, and all these other new powers? Where are these 
skilled people going to come from at a time of funding restraint in all those partners? 
Melanie Dawes: It is something that we discuss, both in relation to local Growth Deals, 
which the LEPs are responsible for, and the devolution deals, which are being led by the combined 
authority and ultimately the mayor. So, in the case of the former, each year now we are conducting 
a financial sustainability assessment for each LEP, which means that the concerns that LEPs set out in 
the NAO Report will be brought out, if LEPs wish to raise them with us, and that will include an 
opportunity for them to say, “Actually, the real problem here is not our resources—it is the local 
authority’s resources that are the problem”. And we can get those issues out on the table and 
discuss them with the local authority involved, if necessary. So that is on the LEP side of the balance 
sheet.
In the case of combined authorities and devolution deals, will they have enough capacity? 
That is something that we keep under discussion with them. In some cases, for example the 
Manchester housing investment fund, they need new capability to run those funds, because they are 
effectively operating a brand-new loan scheme, which is a bit like a bank. And we have invested a lot 
of time and effort, through secondments and so on, in helping them to build that up, by way of 
providing support, but also to make sure we have got the right assurance as we devolve that money 
to them. 
Q119 Nigel Mills: But how many civil servants who have been doing rail, or roads, or smart 
ticketing while sitting in Departments round here will you try to send out to these new authorities, 
so that they can keep using their skills and so that we are not paying people off here to have them 
reappear somewhere else, or not reappear? Presumably, for this to be effective, at some point we 
need to have people who are employed here not being employed here and doing the job 
somewhere else.
Melanie Dawes: At the moment, we are not planning a transfer of specific resources as part 
of the devolution deals. What we are offering local areas is the opportunity for secondments or to 
tap into expertise in Whitehall in particular areas if they need that. That is often very welcome, but 
equally, most local areas want to go it alone and do not necessarily want Whitehall people coming to 
tell them how to do things, just in a different way from how they told them to do it before.
It is something we keep under review. It is not something that local areas are particularly 
raising big concerns about. That is partly because the combined authority areas we are talking about 
often have quite a lot of capacity. When you put all of those local authorities together, the combined 
authority gives them a chance to pool their resources and to sometimes pool slightly more strategic 
resource than any of them were individually able to do before.
Q120 Nigel Mills: How many fewer civil servants in the Departments that are participating in 
this devolution do you think there will be by 2020?
Melanie Dawes: We do not have a figure for that, because it is not an explicit expectation 
that there will necessarily be a quantified reduction due to devolution deals, but all Government 
Departments are making savings again in their administration budgets as part of this spending 
review period. My Department is, BIS is, Transport is and so on.
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Q121 Nigel Mills: But we are creating a lot of cost. If we did a devolution deal for every LEP, 
we would have 39 mayors with all the support staff and everything else. Are we really saying we are 
going to add all that extra cost in and not have any idea how much we take out somewhere else? Do 
you not worry that we are just adding an extra tier on to a load of costs for my local council tax 
payers—they will have parish councils, district councils, county councils, the mayor and Whitehall to 
pay for—without actually taking any of the cost out?
Melanie Dawes: At the moment, those areas are saying to us—Simon might want to 
comment on this—that they can resource their combined authority and their mayor with the 
resources they currently have, and that they are considering how they can make that happen. It is 
about pooling across quite large areas and making better use of the officer support that is already 
available in local government.
Chair: The Comptroller and Auditor General wants to come in. Can we pause there? It is 
worth highlighting that you and the Treasury say this is fiscally neutral. Mr Mills and others are 
raising interesting points.
Sir Amyas Morse: I want to understand a little better what you will be looking at in the 
sustainability reviews you are going to conduct. Can you tell us what the primary agenda of your 
sustainability discussions will be? Does it include an expectation that the LEPs will raise more private 
sector finance to go along with the public sector funding? In other words, when you are talking to 
them and reviewing their progress, will you be saying, “How are you doing in raising money?” I 
assume that means raising it from private as well as public sector sources. I am just trying to get a 
flavour of what the crunch element of the review will be.
Simon Ridley: The annual conversation that we have and will continue to have with each 
local enterprise partnership focuses on their economic strategy and the investment plans beneath it, 
funded by the local growth fund. We will be looking at delivery, spend and achievement of their 
various aims in terms of job creation and delivery.
Sir Amyas Morse: Delivery by the LEP?
Simon Ridley: Delivery of the local growth plan and the local Growth Deal, which the LEP 
oversees but is working very closely with local authorities and other partners to actually deliver. As 
Melanie said earlier, they are the strategic body that set the plan and agreed the deal. We look at 
governance questions, broader assurance questions—as Melanie said, we have the assurance 
framework—and the extent to which that is all in place. We also look at capability. That is an annual 
conversation. LEPs then provide for us a financial sustainability statement about how that is 
underpinned, and then in the delivery part of the conversation, there is a question about how it is 
funded, the money they are raising and the match funding they are raising from both public and 
private sources.
Sir Amyas Morse: So if they are not managing to raise match funding, would that be a 
question as to their sustainability? I am trying to make sure I’m understanding this.
Simon Ridley: LEPs get a central administrative core funding from us of £500,000 per LEP, 
which they are then expected to match with 50%—£250,000. If that was falling short, they would 
either face challenges of financial sustainability or would have made different choices about how 
they deliver. There is then their project funding to deliver projects funded by the growth fund, and if 
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they are looking to raise any money to support that it would clearly impact on delivery rather than 
on the organisation itself.
Q122 Chair: Can I ask for the perspective of Catherine Frances from the Treasury? It has not 
been a perfect outcome for LEPs along the way, though it may be getting better. Can you comment 
on the question the hon. Gentleman has just asked, as well as what lessons there are for devolution 
more generally?
Catherine Frances: We are enormously supportive of what the Department has put in place 
around issues on LEPs assurance—a tighter process of assurance going forward, internal reviews and 
so on. In terms of the funding of LEPs, and the points Simon was just touching on, they are a 
partnership body. They are bodies that are there primarily to bring the voice of business together 
with local government, and they are funded accordingly. 
The wider lessons for devolution are around how central Government can assure ourselves 
that the taxpayer is getting value for money as we engage in devolution deals, and that 
accountability frameworks are clear and right. I think when Sir Nicholas Macpherson was here with 
you a month or so ago, he talked about the fact that, for each element of devolution, we need to be 
clear about where accountability lies. From a Treasury vantage point, we are very clear that Melanie 
has overarching responsibility for the accountability framework for local government, but 
departmental accounting officers also need to be clear about how they work in relation to an 
increasingly devolved world. There is probably more we can do to support them in that. It needs to 
be proportionate; it is different in different cases. 
One of the things we learnt from the LEP example, and which the Department has just put in 
place, is that metrics and measurement systems are helpful, and we can learn a lot from that in the 
devolution deals context. As Melanie and Simon alluded to earlier, this is an evolving area, but each 
Department is starting to go through the process of thinking about what it requires and how it will 
require measurements to be taken locally. In each deal there is a commitment to work up a 
statement of measurement arrangements and monitoring arrangements between central 
Government and local government, which is very important. 
Q123 Chair: What happens from a Treasury perspective if that does not get delivered? So, if 
there was a mayor who was not really up to it, or there was too much political disagreement or 
whatever, what would you do?
Catherine Frances: Sorry for giving you a more complicated answer than you might have 
hoped, but it slightly depends on the subject area. For example, if you look at the Department of 
Health and the devolution that has taken place in the Greater Manchester deal, all of the existing 
accountabilities, in terms of inspection criteria and who owns the money, carry on down the same 
lines as they ever did. 
If you look at the case of adult skills, what you see is that BIS has set down a six-point plan in 
each devolution deal on how to move towards the increasing decentralisation of funding. You would 
have to ask BIS for the details, but it has a set of criteria and a set of defences in the system to 
preserve certain entitlements, for example to maths and English education. In each local area they 
are working through a set of questions around the configuration of the FE sector and whether it is 
viable and sensible, and then gradually devolving from there. 
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Q124 Chair: But that still raises this point—take adult education and adult skills. They have 
gone through the six-point plan and it has been delivered, but it is not working, or perhaps 
something more serious has gone wrong—money has been siphoned off to something else. You 
could say that is complete freedom locally, or you could say that is a big problem.
Catherine Frances: From a Treasury perspective—you would have to ask BIS and DfE for 
their comments—what is important is that the Department is putting in place clear expectations 
about the standards that are expected to be met, and clear frameworks for what happens when 
things start to go wrong with institutions. It is actually doing that with local areas at the moment.
Q125 Chair: But if something goes wrong, the rap is, presumably, with the mayor. Caroline 
Flint and I both represent boroughs that have had serious problems in the past. I’ll leave Caroline 
Flint to comment on the current situation in Doncaster; there are certainly no problems in Hackney 
now, but it cost the British taxpayer £25 million or so to bail out Hackney Council in the bad old days. 
That is what happened. The last resort was for the Government to step in. That was without full 
devolution, admittedly: it was a different set up. What would happen now if something went wrong 
like that?
Catherine Frances: There is a difference between cases of the backstop powers and the 
catastrophic failure point, which Melanie might want to come in on, versus the individual 
frameworks that different Departments are putting in place with devolution deals. Those individual 
frameworks are being developed by Departments at the moment and the answer is slightly different 
in each individual case; the answer is slightly different on skills, slightly different on health, and 
slightly different again on transport. The question that we in the Treasury are keen to help 
Departments with is about when they look at their own accountability frameworks, and when they 
look at their own ways of thinking about the world; they obviously need to take a proportionate 
approach but they do need to look again at how they deliver, and be very clear what happens in 
each eventuality, in order to answer exactly that question. It is important that you can answer that 
question, but it is slightly different in each case and Melanie might be able to talk a bit more on that.
Q126 Chair: A quick answer, Melanie Dawes, on what absolutely happens if there is 
complete meltdown—although you could have a lot of problems in all of these areas that could 
amount to slightly shorter complete meltdowns, so could you briefly answer both of those queries? 
As I mentioned Doncaster, it is only fair to bring Caroline Flint in and then go back to Nigel Mills and 
Karin Smyth. 
Melanie Dawes: In the end we will have the same backstop powers of intervention in a 
combined authority as we have in any local authority today.
Q127 Chair: So, the risk is still with HMG in Whitehall?
Melanie Dawes: Yes, so for example—and it does depend exactly how BIS decide to set up 
their framework and what they require—if they feel that a combined authority and a mayor are 
failing in their duty to deliver the services that were agreed, and there will almost certainly be 
statutory responsibilities within the skills area—
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Chair: They can step in.
Melanie Dawes: They can step in.
Q128 Chair: What about financially, though?
Melanie Dawes: If it is financial, that is back in my overall accountability for the system, and 
it will be as it is now. Over the past year we have taken the points that you made in your Reports on 
financial sustainability—the Reports of the Committee and also of the NAO— very seriously and 
have seriously upped the ante in the Department in our oversight of risks so that we can understand 
where the emerging pressures are. I think my colleague Mr Duncan set some of this out when he 
came to speak to you a couple of weeks ago. 
Q129 Chair: So, let’s say a combined authority goes financially wrong because of very bad 
political management locally, millions of pounds of public money is at risk and it needs a lot to bail it 
out. Would that happen? Would there be a bail-out? You would hope to notice it beforehand, 
wouldn’t you?
Melanie Dawes: I would hope we had got there long before a bail-out was needed. 
However, as we do now, we will keep an overview of risk in the system and understand whether 
there are patterns—for example, different types of authority that might be more likely to be under 
pressure than others—so that we can work out what kind of intervention might be needed. That 
might be about an individual service area, such as health, for example.
Q130 Chair: To finish up on that point, will you be consulting the Committee on the financial 
accountability frameworks or will you expect other Departments to do that for those that they are 
establishing?
Melanie Dawes: At the moment, we are—Simon is overseeing all this work across 
Whitehall—
Q131 Chair: Sorry, I’m not trying to trip you up, but just yes or no: will you expect those 
Departments to check with us? We have done accountability in Government and we do it often. I 
thought it was a simple question, so—
Melanie Dawes: They will all need to be published, both the system statements on a deal-
by-deal basis, and the ones that operate on a Departmental basis. This will be a matrix—quite a 
complicated one. They will all be published and it is a very fair challenge as to how we might consult 
you on that. We will certainly be sharing with the NAO as we go along.
Q132 Chair: I partly raise that because some MPs are concerned that they have not been 
consulted by central Government on the devolution model. As they have pointed out, powers are 
going from central Government, which is an area that MPs scrutinise, to local government; it has 
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been given away from an area that they scrutinise to an area that they have a different relationship 
with, and they haven’t been consulted formally as individual constituents—
Melanie Dawes: In many areas, such as skills, there will be legislation to achieve devolution, 
so there will be a chance for Parliament to look at the detailed arrangements through that route.
Chair: I love the way you have such faith that we can change legislation once Government 
have proposed it, but that is a debate for another day.
Q133 Caroline Flint: I am sure we will come back to this discussion, particularly on scrutiny, 
in more detail in other sessions. I am a big fan of devolution but, like a lot of colleagues here and in 
the House, I think the lack of attention to detail on scrutiny and the auditing of what is going on is a 
massive hole in the strategy. I just want to pick up on something that was said in relation to the LEP 
in the earlier session. According to the LEP NAO Report, as figure 17 on page 44 indicates, 42% of the 
business people involved in LEPs do not publish a register of interests. Figure 18 on page 45 shows 
that only a third of LEPs publish financial information on their websites. Given that Mr McTague, 
representing the Federation of Small Businesses, thought that this was a glaring error in the public 
accountability—and you did say that the LEPs were there to strategically inform what projects—why 
can’t the Department demand better financial transparency?
Melanie Dawes: We are demanding better financial transparency. These are the areas 
where we set in place the internal audit review that I was referring to earlier that started last 
October and concluded in January and February this year and resulted in us writing to every LEP 
saying where they had fallen down on the standards which we expect.
Q134 Chair: They haven’t been required to do it before. Was it actually the Department or 
Government falling down not by requesting it in the first place?
Melanie Dawes: We have required these standards.
Chair: From the beginning—
Melanie Dawes: From the beginning; this was in the assurance statement that we required.
Chair: They didn’t take much notice of Government then.
Q135 Caroline Flint: What is the consequence of that if a business person does not provide 
on their register what their financial interests are? We are all expected to do it and we are held to 
account if we don’t.
Melanie Dawes: In some cases, the LEPs have got the registers but they weren’t published 
and so they need to publish them. That is very clear and that is what we said to them.
Chair: In some cases, then,  you are suggesting—
Melanie Dawes: We will audit this again if we think we need to, and we will take this into 
account if they don’t comply as we think about how to manage them in the future.
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Q136 Caroline Flint: When these individual businessmen and women are making strategic 
decisions about different projects to support, has anybody gone through and clarified whether there 
is any conflict of interest for any of those individuals in taking part in a discussion on such an 
important strategic matter involving public funds?
Melanie Dawes: They are all required to have a conflict of interest statement. They are all 
required to go through that process. If you like, we can write to you to confirm whether or not we 
have any concerns on specific cases. I don’t believe that we do and we are now requiring them to get 
a lot better at this. I should also clarify, while we have the opportunity, on page 44 all but one of the 
areas on the grid are required by us—none of them are optional apart from one, which is having 
independent scrutiny arrangements in place. I think that is because that goes through the local 
authority route.
Chair: I am aware that Nigel Mills and Karin Smyth may have some further points.
Q137 Karin Smyth: I recognise what Caroline Flint said about complexity. We have individual 
arrangements for each Department, we have the mayoral manifesto, we have the combined 
authorities coming together to have somebody to be held to account, and we have the systems 
statement from the Department, so it is a complex issue. The issue that still concerns me is our role 
as Members of Parliament when a voter comes to us to say X has happened or X has gone wrong—
where we can hold to account and where the local holds to account. That remains the thread that 
will continue to exercise us.
My final question goes back to Ms Frances in terms of the issue of skills coming out of 
Government. If this goes the way the policy intends, the staffing and skills requirements of central 
Government will be quite different, won’t they?
Catherine Frances: Yes, I think it substantially depends which part of central Government 
you are looking at.
Q138 Karin Smyth: My question, then, is are you thinking about what capacity changes will 
happen in central Government? What different skills need to be brought in, and how are you making 
sure that that happens?
Catherine Frances: From a Treasury perspective, we haven’t done very much work on that in 
detail, but I think if you look at individual Departments—so, for example, the example Melanie gave 
on the housing investment fund in Manchester—individual Departments have started to work in 
that way.
In a sense, the question is—well, you know, if you are in the Department of Health, you are 
thinking about how you deal with devolution, how you work with NHSE and local bodies beneath 
NHSE, and how you work with local government. There are a lot of skills programmes designed to 
look at that. It is going to vary from place to place. We haven’t taken a whole system view from the 
Treasury.
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Q139 Karin Smyth: Do you think you should take a wider view? If this is the policy direction 
for a number of years from central Government, surely it requires the development of those sorts of 
skills and approaches to make it successful.
Catherine Frances: I certainly agree that it will require a change in certain skill mixes in 
certain Departments, but I would come back to the point that the heads of those Departments both 
will answer your accountability questions—there are clearly issues here on which we need to work 
up greater clarification to assure you through the accounting officer route—and head up 
Departments, and they will need to take a view about what skills and capability changes they need 
as they undertake certain types of devolution in their areas. In some Departments, contracts are still 
held centrally and it is a question of getting external influence from local areas; in some areas, it is 
about actually taking investment funds and handing over the running of them locally.
Q140 David Mowat: There will be a lot of stuff to work through in this, but to be clear, given 
that large chunks of expenditure and accountability are moving from the centre to other places, all 
other things being equal, am I right in saying for the avoidance of doubt that we would expect there 
to be headcount changes in the centre as a consequence of that? There is no ambiguity on that.
Melanie Dawes: Over the civil service as a whole in this Parliament, there will be further 
headcount cuts. That is planned. That is part of all our spending review settlements. A number of 
different things contribute to that, and devolution is one of those. On the point about skills, though, 
I do agree that for those areas of Government that are really devolving, this is a difference. This is a 
change from being the planner and the designer to being the convenor, the facilitator and the 
system owner, and that is a different role. I sit on the civil service people board, and there are a 
number of areas of challenge where we need to change the kinds of skills we have as a civil service. 
Getting in more external expertise, getting more commercial and getting better at engaging with the 
outside world is a perennial challenge for Whitehall, but devolution brings it into even sharper relief.
Q141 Nigel Mills: While we are on the accountability of the LEPs, I have two questions. First, 
are you tempted to try to change their structure so they are not all some kind of different company 
structure or partnership but proper bodies that have certain public duties? Secondly, do you now 
think they should all be reporting into the mayors, where they are going to have one in their 
devolved area? It will be a bit strange to have the LEP reporting up to you and not to the mayor that 
effectively has those powers.
Simon Ridley: On the first question, local enterprise partnerships have determined the 
structures they want to have and we do not have any plans to force them into one structure or 
another, and there does not seem to be any great need to.
Q142 Nigel Mills: Even though they have gone from doing not very much to spending £7 
billion.
Simon Ridley: Well, their fundamental role of bringing the private sector into strategic 
leadership of the economic development of the area through the strategic economic plan remains 
the same. The money behind it to invest in projects to develop growth outcomes locally has gone up, 
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through the local growth fund, but the local authorities are still the accountable bodies, with the 
audit, financial, accountability and scrutiny structures behind that.
Q143 Nigel Mills: But if they decide where £7 billion is being spent, should they not be 
subject to all the demands, scrutiny and disclosures that we would expect from a public body, and 
not just be some strange partnership that was formed five years ago because that was easy?
Simon Ridley: They are partnerships that were formed. They are mixtures of private sector 
representatives and elected members of councils, in the main, so they are rooted in the democratic 
bodies in the areas for which they are determining these strategies and then making the 
investments. That overall strategic role is the one that remains.
Q144 Chair: But, Mr Ridley, Karin Smyth and I did a representative visit to Bristol and there 
were some very good things going on, but ultimately what we concluded in our Report—you might 
have read it—was that the LEP can make decisions but the council tax payers of the local boroughs 
take the rap if something goes wrong. The businesspeople on the LEP—I am sure a lot of them do 
very good work and put in a lot of time and effort—can walk away. They might have reputational 
damage, but they will not have any financial loss. There is a big accountability gap there. The reason 
we are talking about LEPs today is because that is an example of what has been devolved, and we 
are learning lessons for the devolution models.
Melanie Dawes: The financial accountability does run through the section 151 officers in the 
relevant local authorities, so they are ultimately accountable for the system, for its overall oversight, 
for the money going where it should and so on. That is quite important.
Q145 Chair: I know, but what I am saying is that if you are a businessperson who is the chair 
or a member of a LEP, you shape decisions and persuade the local authorities, in good faith—you no 
doubt will go through certain due diligence—but if it goes wrong, the buck stops with the council tax 
payers locally, not with you. I accept that businesspeople on the LEP may be individual council tax 
payers. There is quite a big gap between power and—
Melanie Dawes: I do agree that that is the situation, but local elected members are on the 
boards of LEPs to represent those local council tax payers. That is why we are resting on the overall 
system of local government accountability, and the way in which we are channelling the funding is 
so we are resting on those democratic institutions. 
Q146 John Pugh: May I ask a few basic questions? Earlier, one of my colleagues referred to 
the situation as a bit of a mess. I think that it may not be, but I am going to try out my understanding 
of what I think is supposed to happen and you can tell me where I am wrong. There are two players 
on the field at the moment, aren’t there? There are the people who negotiate the City region deals, 
who get the £30 million bung a year and are left, by and large, to do as they wish with that money. 
That is reviewed every five years. The local Growth Deals, which are run through the LEP, run parallel 
to that. They may well show very similar sorts of objectives in mind. You, Melanie, said that the 
behaviour of the LEPs is tracked by your Department, so they are, in some sense, answerable to 
central Government for what they do; you are looking at what they do. In terms of devolution 
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though, am I right in saying that none of the devolution deals have actually subordinated the LEPs to 
the city region—have they?
Melanie Dawes: No, they haven’t.
Q147 John Pugh: And how many of them have given the city region cabinet an enhanced 
role in scrutinising the LEP?
Melanie Dawes: No, they haven’t.
Q148 John Pugh: That is all I want to know. So, basically, you have two autonomous bodies. 
In Merseyside recently, the chair of the LEP—who represented Peel Holdings in his professional life, 
and the LEP and strategic priorities for Liverpool in his public life—stepped down. Who will appoint 
the successor there? Will it be central Government or could it be appointed locally?
Melanie Dawes: It is a local decision. 
John Pugh: A local decision by whom? 
Melanie Dawes: By the other members of the LEP, which will include the local council 
leaders and other local business leaders.
John Pugh: Right. So the LEP basically—
Melanie Dawes: As was the case when LEPs were originally set up.
Simon Ridley: And it is worth being clear that LEPs have very much been part of the 
discussion and development of devolution deals with us. LEPs are signatories to the vast majority of 
the devolution deals and to their different arrangements in the governance of the combined 
authorities on how they will relate to LEPs. They are not quite separate.
Q149 John Pugh: I just simply want you to confirm that although it is hoped that they will all 
congregate around the same vision, they are, essentially, autonomous beings, if I can put it like that.
Melanie Dawes: I don’t think they are quite autonomous because the LEP board is partly 
made up of the locally elected members.
Q150 John Pugh: In some places.
Melanie Dawes: In all cases there are council members on the board. They are not a 
majority but they are represented.
John Pugh: But the leverage they have varies from place to place. 
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Q151 Chair: I just want to touch on a couple of quick points. Then I will bring in Richard 
Bacon, and then Karin and Nigel, if they have any final points. The Report mentions EU funds. I think 
that Cornwall is one of the authorities that is bidding to have a status that means it can be 
controllable. But, as I understand it, that is not something that can be guaranteed. 
Simon Ridley: It’s not guaranteed. In devolution deals, with respect to EU funding, we have 
agreed with the places where we are doing devolution something called partial intermediate body 
status. Forgive the jargon. It means that it is passing down greater powers to the local areas where 
we are doing this to determine the calls out for projects to be in line with local priorities, and to 
make the assessment of which projects are funded based on local priorities so that, in every local 
area, there is a growth committee. That growth committee would go to the intermediate body—that 
is, Cornwall—to determine which projects go forward, rather than straight to us. 
Q152 Chair: So the growth committee would be a body under the mayor’s office.
Simon Ridley: It’s by each LEP area. The intermediate body is part of a combined authority’s 
powers, so they then make the decisions rather than that coming straight to us. 
Q153 Chair: So, are they carving up bits of money that Cornwall already has or are they 
helping to bid—
Simon Ridley: It’s about determining the spend of the European funding for that region, so it 
is giving them more influence over a pot of European money that is available. It is still inside the 
regulations of the ERDF funding. 
Q154 Chair: Of course, we don’t know how much that money might be in future years. 
Obviously, there is a decision on 23 June that might influence it—but apart from that— 
Simon Ridley: But we are essentially doing this from the beginning of the current 
programme. 
Q155 Chair: Okay. One of the concerns that has been raised with us is around the timescale. 
There was that very tight six-week bid for local authority areas to get together. Is that the pace at 
which you normally expect to work, because a lot of bids—well, there has not been progress on 
some of them since then? 
Melanie Dawes: In the months following a general election when there is an immediate 
spending review: yes. It is not what we would normally hope to work to. As I said earlier, we have 
had a lot of local authorities that came forward with ideas and proposals that we are still working 
with, so, for many, the timescale is considerably longer. 
Q156 Chair: In the Report, there is a good table showing the per capita funding; Karin Smyth 
has explained to me why the west of England seems to get more— 
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Karin Smyth: We are a net contributor to the Treasury; we contribute £10 billion. 
Chair: Maybe the Treasury can comment on that. It does seem that there is quite a variation 
on per capita funding. There are some reasons for that that the NAO go into, but they also say that 
they are not clear—
Keith Davis: Page 24. 
Chair: Yes, paragraph 1.16 on page 24 says: “These took account of a range of factors 
including the extent of proposed governance” and so on. It is not clear how this translates to the 
specific amounts allocated. I wonder if you could comment on that, Catherine Frances?
Catherine Frances: Yes, absolutely. When we considered deals and deals’ readiness to 
proceed, as Melanie said, we asked places to bid and they then came forward—we were keen to do 
that so that they were part of the spending review process and we would get their ideas in—we 
looked at their readiness to consider governance reform, their policy-readiness, the sensibleness of 
their geographical proposals and whether there was any consensus around those issues that we 
have discussed. When we had then decided that we were negotiating with an area, we essentially 
arrived at numbers here that were the product of individual negotiations with each area; it was what 
was acceptable to both Ministers centrally and local representatives. There is a degree, as the 
Committee has commented on, of coalescence around a certain number of key numbers. To be 
totally frank with you, what I think was happening was that local people coming to negotiate with 
the centre were very keen that they were given an equivalent sum of funding to other people 
negotiating with the centre. So that sort of dynamic developed, but it is a product of direct 
negotiation with each place. 
Q157 Chair: Okay. Do the National Audit Office want to come in on that? 
Keith Davis: Well, that is clear and transparent about the basis of funding, isn’t it?
Q158 Chair: One of the issues raised with us is the difference in per capita spending, as the 
Committee has discussed with other budgets, between, say, London and another part of the 
country. Do you have a similar breakdown per capita of current spending that is devolved or sent 
down from Government? No, not devolved: that is being spent by Government in those areas now? 
Can you do a comparison?
Catherine Frances: Across all different policy areas or only in—
Chair: Let’s take for example—
Caroline Flint: Transport.
Chair: Transport is a good one, because most of the other local areas are taking it in and it is 
being devolved. Currently there will a spend on transport in London, which I guess might be quite 
high because we have the underground and so on, and there will be spending in Bristol, which 
doesn’t have an underground so the sum might be a bit less, and in Amber Valley, where spending is 
probably on roads, as in Lincolnshire where there are no railways. We have completely different 
areas, so there will be different amounts of spending and no doubt there will be a per capita 
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calculation done, or which could be done, by the Department for Transport. Presumably you have 
that information? Have you looked at that in relation to the per capita funding under the new deals 
that we are doing?
Melanie Dawes: I think, technically, you can look at any of these budgets and compare them 
to population levels locally but all the individual decisions will have been made on a variety of 
different factors. 
Q159 Chair: But are they getting more or less than they would be getting? 
Melanie Dawes: Generally, on the transport funding, the amount that is being allocated to 
local areas is pretty much what the Department for Transport expected would be that local area’s 
element of the local transport funds, but it is now being given to them in a more devolved way. That 
is the prize for them. 
Q160 Chair: Before I bring the CAG in, are those figures clear and available? If I, as a 
Member, wanted to look up and see how much my area got from a Department now, is there 
somewhere I can go and get that, or is that something that you can get us? 
Melanie Dawes: I would be very happy to get back to you on what’s available and to confirm 
that. 
Q161 Chair: A lot of people are very interested in this so it would be very interesting. 
Melanie Dawes: I think it is a fair challenge as to whether we might need to improve what is 
available in these sorts of areas, partly for the reasons of democratic accountability that we have 
been discussing. 
Q162 Chair: There’s a danger—and maybe a reality—that people believe that they will get 
less than they were already getting, or in some areas they may get more than they were getting 
already. It is about transparency, although Catherine Frances has given us some reassurance on that. 
Comptroller and Auditor General?
Sir Amyas Morse: Sorry, I was just trying to visualise the discussions for the various areas 
that came out at roughly the same number. I can understand that there might have been the same 
aspiration, but you are not saying that these areas all came in with the same opening bid, are you? 
They did not just miraculously all come in at £30 million. It must have been more that they came up 
with other numbers, but then when they came into the office and said, “We’d like £60 million or £90 
million”, you said, “Look, everybody’s getting £30 million, don’t be so silly, you’re not getting that.”7 
Are you really saying that the means by which this pretty uniform set of funding happened was only 
that these areas self-limited their aspirations, and all said that they just wanted the same amount? 
There must have been another side to the dialogue, surely. I am sorry to be cynical, but I am just 
trying to understand it.
7 Figures clarified by the National Audit Office in correspondence to Committee, 10 May 2016
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Catherine Frances: It is certainly the case that, as you would expect in any negotiation, 
places aimed at totally different levels. I am sure you would not be surprised to know that. As we 
were doing these negotiations, we were negotiating on a range of factors. What policy was being 
devolved and all that kind of questions were in play. In a sense, the money is just one element of 
that.
Sir Amyas Morse: But an important element.
Catherine Frances: An important element, indeed. I certainly wouldn’t doubt that. 
Essentially, this was a point where we had to go to Ministers and ask them if they were happy with 
this level of spending, and locally the representatives had to decide whether they were happy with 
this level of spending too. It is not absolute uniformity by any means. A set of figures was arrived at. 
Perhaps I can come back on the point about the principle of fair shares of funding more widely. I 
understand the point you are making about transparency. That is very important, but it is also 
important to understand that in quite a lot of these areas of business, the budgets actually are not 
necessarily being devolved. In the case of DWP, for example, you still have contractual management 
that is happening centrally, but you have local influence over that, and in the case of the transport 
budgets—
Q163 Chair: We have some of the per capita figures for the ones that are underway at the 
moment, but we are just keen to see more of that sort of information.
Melanie Dawes: Yes, I understand.
Q164 Chair: Because if we are talking about transparency and accountability, your average 
citizen can get that, your average MP can get that, and your average councillor can get that. It is a 
useful way of making comparisons between the status quo and what is coming, because money is a 
major part of this and something that many will be watching. Just a couple of quick points from me 
before I bring in Richard Bacon. I want to cover the ground. We are already hearing about some 
fracturing. County Durham MPs have written urging their voters not to support this proposal. We 
have heard some of the concerns from East Anglia. There is actually not a uniform acceptance for 
things that have been billed by the Department as having been agreed. How many of them need to 
opt out before this policy becomes unsustainable?
Melanie Dawes: Well, I don’t have a lot more to add to what we were saying earlier, which 
is that in the end if individual local authorities decide to opt out of a deal, that is a decision for them. 
Obviously we hope that they won’t, but if that happens then that is a decision for them.
Q165 Chair: Take Greater Lincolnshire, because we know that there are 10 local authorities 
there. Let’s say that in the end five of them decide not to go with it. Does it still carry on being a 
Greater Lincolnshire bid when there are five members who sit round the table but don’t have the 
same voting rights?
Melanie Dawes: I think that remains to be seen. Our Ministers would have to take a view on 
that. Where a new combined authority or mayoral structure has been put in place, there is also a 
statutory test that has to be passed of improving the exercise of statutory functions in that area. 
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That might be relevant in some places. I think that it just remains to be seen, and we cannot 
comment any more on that now.
Q166 Chair: Suppose that there was a deal breaker. We know that Cambridge is pulling out 
because they want more control over housing. To make it sustainable, if Cambridge and a couple of 
other authorities were putting significant effort into making a really good devolved deal, would they 
be able to come back and renegotiate on parts of that? Would that be something that you would 
consider in order to make it a sustainable model for devolved local government?
Melanie Dawes: Well, the dialogue that is going on now on East Anglia is about what the 
local areas want to do. Some have said that they do not want to do it on the current terms. That is 
part of the conversation that they are having, and our Ministers are quite actively involved in 
discussions on that. We are still working with them on that deal.
Q167 Chair: Do you think that part of it is because of the rush that happened before, and 
people had to sign up for things that they were not ready for?
Melanie Dawes: I don’t think that I can really comment on that. In the end, there is always a 
balance for any agreement that you are trying to strike. A deadline can help focus the mind; it can 
help get people over the line, but sometimes there is more work to do afterwards. 
Q168 Chair: Okay. This my final question before I pass over to Richard Bacon and it relates to 
the issue of health boundaries. There have been some discussions locally about health, through the 
normal models of the Department of Health taking on responsibilities. I am not talking particularly 
about the Manchester model. How can health locally work on different boundaries from the 
emerging local devolution models? Does that make sense to you, Melanie Dawes? 
Melanie Dawes: It is helpful when boundaries are coterminous. You can see that in places 
such as Manchester and Cornwall. Sometimes I think we just have to recognise that the geography is 
genuinely complicated. 
Q169 Chair: We weren’t talking about whether it is less complicated. It seems to me that 
health officials locally can get together and decide what works for them, and local government may 
put in a bid for what works for them. It is like there is no connection between the two. Where is the 
democratic accountability in a bunch of officials sitting in a room and deciding, and then finding it 
does not match up with your local authority? 
Melanie Dawes: To be honest, this is an issue that is with us all the time. It is not just about 
devolution deals. The transformation areas from NHS England have been part of an active debate 
with local government, mainly in the county areas, because that is where some of the most difficult 
boundary issues have emerged. 
Q170 Chair: That’s my point. Health seems to act independently of this major Government 
policy on devolving to certain areas. I am puzzled as to what conversations you are having with the 
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Department of Health. Is there any attempt to get alignment? Given that public health is now with 
local government, that seems to make obvious sense. If you look at the Manchester model that may 
roll out wider in time, it would be crazy if they were all working to completely different boundaries. 
Melanie Dawes: I would make two points. One is that we do try to co-ordinate this, and we 
have really stepped up the governance on this in Whitehall in the past six months. Simon’s group is 
the place where we bring people together, and that operates at a senior level and includes the 
Department of Health, which does work very closely with us in fact. 
Sometimes the boundaries are just not going to coincide. There are quite good reasons why 
health economies and economic areas are different. One is about where people live, primarily, and it 
is often about older people as well. The other is about where they work. In some cases, particularly 
once you get into rural areas, you do see a difference. That does not mean that we should not push 
back sometimes and ask the Department of Health to reconsider, so that does sometimes happen. 
From their point of view, there are also often quite clear trust arrangements already in place that 
define the way that service is delivered now. It would be silly of us to ignore those. 
Q171 Chair: We may raise that with Simon Stevens when he comes in front of us. 
Melanie Dawes: I think that would be helpful. 
Q172 Mr Bacon: I do not have a lot to add. You said in relation to the policy that the elected 
mayor is the deal on the table for these devolution areas. That is the decision. You also said that 
there were no specific plans to reduce the number of people in the Department because functions 
will be carried on elsewhere by the elected mayor. 
I don’t think your evidence is suggesting that government is so good for you that we need to 
have even more of it, but we do have this situation where we are going to have something in 
addition to the councils. In my own area of Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridge there are more than 900 
district councillors. If you add on the 228 county councillors, you get to 1,100 and something. If you 
add on Peterborough, which is unitary, you get to almost 1,200 councillors, which feels a little top-
heavy. That excludes the parishes, which would probably account for another 6,000 councillors. So 
there are 7,500 councillors for the area, one for every 300 people or so. 
Notwithstanding that it is the Government’s policy to cut the cost of politics and streamline 
the cost to Government and share services, I do not get a sense of where within all of that those 
streamlinings and savings and greater levels of co-ordination will occur. With an elected mayor, you 
are actually introducing what is in effect a fourth tier of government. How—hence the use of the 
word “how”—in light of the Government’s policy, do you see that streamlining taking place? 
Melanie Dawes: The question of political streamlining—if I can use that phrase—in other 
words, thinking about the overall numbers of elected members—
Q173 Mr Bacon: And local governmental.
Melanie Dawes: Yes, but political membership is a pretty high-level policy question. The 
Government’s view is that this is bottom up, so if areas choose to come together within a combined 
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authority in different ways, they may decide to do that. But, in a sense, that is not something on 
which there is a particular view from where I sit. On the officer support—the executive support—we 
have already seen a lot more consolidation over the last few years. Chief executives are being 
shared; that has happened in East Anglia and is happening in London and all over the country. In 
some cases it is quite ambitious. To be honest, I think Whitehall could learn some lessons from it 
about sharing functions more actively. That is happening already. We are not requiring more of it as 
part of these deals, but it may well happen as part of them.
Q174 Mr Bacon: But as an accounting officer, you want to be sure that local government is 
efficient, effective and economic. Shouldn’t you be requiring a bit more? When John Manzoni sat 
where you are sitting, by the way, he said that one of the things he was most concerned about was 
shared services, because they are not working that well. That is what he said, not that long ago. 
Shouldn’t you be trying to encourage them a bit more, as part of your responsibilities as accounting 
officer?
Melanie Dawes: I think shared transactional services were probably what John was referring 
to. He is right: there is a very difficult history of those services in the civil service. There is actually 
more success in local government, where quite a lot of sharing is already happening—pension fund 
consolidation, sharing of officers, sharing of executive teams. The Government have not decided in 
this Parliament to set out a stronger agenda to require local government to do more sharing; it was a 
conscious policy decision not to try to dictate that from the centre. Where it happens, we try to 
support it. We certainly try to learn best practice from it as well, and I know that the LGA also tries 
to make sure that best practice is shared.
Q175 Mr Bacon: Is it the Government view that it is okay to have a four-tier structure?
Melanie Dawes: Well, that is the policy, yes.
Q176 Chair: One of the other issues we touched on previously was the number of people 
working in Whitehall Departments in London. We have had interesting conversations with a number 
of your colleagues about this. In answer to an earlier question, you indicated that there wouldn’t 
necessarily be a move of people from Whitehall to some of the jobs with the same functions in the 
devolved areas of responsibility. Do you want to clarify that? Are you saying that the same number 
of people will be in Whitehall even with the new structures being set up?
Melanie Dawes: There will be fewer people in Whitehall by the end of this Parliament, in my 
Department and in other Departments.
Q177 Chair: Is that separate from this policy? That is what we are driving at. Is this policy 
going to lead to people being—
Melanie Dawes: It is the overall picture within which we are all working in Departments. In 
some cases, although it is certainly not the case now, devolution may be one of the things that 
Departments are able to use to manage with fewer resources. Interestingly, we are not finding that, 
as part of devolution deals, local areas are coming and saying to us, “Please can I have your team 
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from the Department for Transport as part of my deal?” That has not been something that they have 
particularly put on the table.
Mr Bacon: Perhaps that is because of the way the Department ran the intercity west coast 
franchise competition—perhaps they haven’t got the right skills.
Q178 Chair: Let’s not go there. But it will be interesting to see if we can ever attract that. I 
want to touch on the fact that Westminster City Council has tried to come up with a sub-regional 
public accounts committee for the tri-borough. Are you aware of whether that is working? Have you 
looked at that?
Melanie Dawes: I don’t know very much about it yet, but I’ll be interested to find out more.
Q179 Chair: I think the Centre for Public Scrutiny has done a report on the subject. We are 
always keen to see more public accounts committees; that is one area we could see an expansion in. 
My final point is about the accountability of MPs. I raised earlier the idea of the Public Accounts 
Committee looking at the financial accountability frameworks. I don’t know whether you are willing 
to make a commitment, because we can look at anything we want, but it would be good to look at 
those before they are implemented. If you talk to your colleagues across Whitehall, we can find the 
time to look at how financial accountability will be managed through devolution. We would be 
interested to do that. In a way, it might be one of the last parts we play in this, because as things are 
devolved it will not be a responsibility entirely for the Public Accounts Committee, although we may 
still have an interest in it. Is that something that you would consider?
Melanie Dawes: We’d be very happy to discuss a sensible way to do that with you, yes. May 
I add that we will be producing an annual report on devolution? That is one of the requirements in 
the new Act, and we are expecting to do it in the next few months. It will be a chance for us to set 
out some of this landscape. Indeed, if you have views on what that report should contain, it would 
be helpful to hear them.
Q180 Chair: I am sure that my colleague MPs will as well, because I have had a lot of interest 
in this hearing. Perhaps I can ask the NAO to engage with you on that. I appreciate your openness to 
do that and to take it as it is meant; I look forward to talking to you and your colleagues further. 
With bottom up decisions and local government coming together at pace because of the 
spending review, can you make any commitment to involve MPs here in Parliament more in knowing 
what is going to happen in their local area? Obviously, there will be local discussions, but given that 
these are national responsibilities being devolved down, there is a role for national parliamentarians 
as well. Can you give any assurances to colleagues of mine who are concerned about their lack of 
involvement in this, from the perspective of Parliament? They may get involved locally, but they 
don’t really have involvement through parliamentary Select Committees. 
Melanie Dawes: There has been engagement by many local MPs in the deal at the local 
level. As we come to finalise the implementation plans for each deal and to clarify the 
accountabilities, what is actually being devolved and what the future arrangements will be, it is a 
good idea for us to make sure that we engage with the relevant Members of this Parliament on what 
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that means. We are very happy to make that commitment. Our Ministers may wish to do it, or we 
could arrange official briefings, simply to make sure that the landscape is understood. 
Q181 Chair: But not just understood, because MPs here will be discussing, debating and 
legislating on some of the frameworks involved. The money will then go down the line to local 
government. So we still have a role, even though the actual delivery of those services will be 
devolved. I flag that up because colleagues have raised concerns about that. I take your commitment 
there, though. 
Melanie Dawes: It is a good point and I will raise it with my Ministers. We should discuss 
quite how to do that, but I am sure that they will be happy to engage with local MPs as part of this 
process. 
Chair: I think that sooner rather than later is the message I am getting from people, so I pass 
that on to you as a bit of advice. Thank you very much for coming along. It is the beginning of a 
longer discussion, which will obsess us all over the next four years. Future Public Accounts 
Committees will be looking at it, too. You can pick up some of our concerns about this—about how 
things will be measured and monitored and how, in the end, those local areas will know that they 
are still getting the right amount of money. Even if they think that they got it right at the beginning, 
things change over time; how will that be evaluated? 
There are lots of areas that we did not get time to go into today, so we will be having you 
back—we will be focusing on this a great deal. Thank you for engaging in this discussion and 
answering our questions. Our transcript will be out in the next couple of days. We will let you know 
when our Report will come out, but it will probably be towards the beginning of June. 
